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THE UNJUSTIFIED JUDICIAL CREATION OF CLASS





The class action device is vital to deterring securities fraud and
remedying its victims, who almost never suffer losses sufficient to
justify an individual suit.' Nonetheless, the federal courts have be-
gun to convert the class certification process into a premature trial
on the merits, thereby precluding victims of securities fraud from
pursuing otherwise valid claims of financial wrongdoing. In par-
ticular, in a series of important decisions, the federal courts have
required plaintiffs to prove the essential elements of their securi-
ties fraud claims at the preliminary class certification stage.
This Article demonstrates why this trend should end. The judi-
cial creation of class certification merits trials in securities fraud
cases is inconsistent with the federal securities laws and Supreme
Court precedent. Moreover, judicial resolution of the merits of a
securities fraud claim at the class certification threshold infringes
on the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. Nor can class cer-
tification merits trials be excused by any legitimate policy concerns.
The harm purportedly averted by these trials is illusory. The sup-
posed threat that class certification and post-certification discovery
costs will produce in terrorem settlements is unfounded and illogi-
cal. Finally, this Article concludes that the harm caused by class
certification merits trials is substantial. This new procedure will
over-deter the very type of private securities fraud actions that both
supplement Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement
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actions and compensate victims for losses caused by securities
fraud.
II. CERTIFYING A SECURITIES CLASS ACTION
This Part provides a brief overview of the requirements to certify
a securities class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
Next, this Part discusses the essential elements of a securities fraud
case. Understanding these elements is necessary as plaintiffs must
establish a commonality and predominance of such elements to
become a certifiable class. The elements of loss causation and the
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance are of particular im-
portance. Last, this Part examines the emerging standard by which
courts determine if a class action should be certified, namely what
kind of "resolution" of the issues is required.
A. Certifying a Class: Rule 23
Securities litigation usually takes the form of a class action be-
cause the class action device makes uneconomic actions economical
to bring as a class.3 Not only do securities actions typically take the
form of class actions, securities class actions are the largest single
category of class action. Most class actions turn on class certifica-
tion: its grant or denial typically results in either settlement or
dismissal.5 Securities class actions must meet the requirements of
both Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b).6 Rule 23(a) has four elements:
(1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy.7
2. In re LDK Solar Sec. Litig., 255 F.R.D. 519, 525-26 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
3. David S. Evans, Class Certification, the Merits, and Expert Evidence, 11 GEo. MASON L.
REV. 1, 4-5 (2002).
4. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Stefan Paulovic, Class Certification: Developments Over the Last
Five Years 2002-2007: The Future of Class Actions, in PRACTISING LAW INST., CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION 2008: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE STRATEGIES 193 (2008).
5. Dwightj. Davis et al., Expert Opinion in Class Certifications: Second Circuit Revisits, Dis-
avows In re Visa Check and Joins Majority Rule, 74 DEF. CouNs.J. 253, 253 (2007).
6. Ross v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., No. 2:05-cv-0819, 2008 WL 4059873, at *2 (S.D.
Ohio Aug. 26, 2008).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Numerosity requires that the class be so large thatjoinder of
all members is impracticable. In re Micron Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 247 F.R.D. 627, 632 (D.
Idaho 2007). As a rule of thumb, numerosity is presumed where the class would have at least
forty members. Lapin v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 254 F.R.D. 168, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). For
.securities fraud class actions relating to publicly owned and nationally listed corporations,
the numerosity requirement may be satisfied by showing that a large number of shares were
outstanding and traded during the relevant period." Id. (quoting In re Vivendi Universal,
S.A., 242 F.R.D. 76, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)). Next, there must be questions of fact and law com-
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The threshold for meeting Rule 23(a) is not considered demand-
ing.
Once Rule 23(a) has been satisfied, the class must be maintain-
able under either Rule 23(b) (1), (b) (2), or (b) (3).' Rule 23(b) (1)
class actions are maintainable if either (1) the defendant is at risk
of inconsistent adjudication or (2) the class members are fighting
over a limited fund.' Rule 23(b) (2) class actions are maintainable
if the class seeks solely injunctive relief." Last, Rule 23(b) (3) class
actions are maintainable if questions of law and fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members.2 The predominance requirement is simi-
lar to the commonality requirement; however, it is considered far
more demanding. 3 The predominance requirement mandates that
a court consider how a trial on the merits would be conducted if it
certified the class. 4 This requires that the court: (1) identify out-
come determinative issues, (2) assess which of these issues will
predominate, and (3) then determine whether the issues are
common to the class.'1 In addition, Rule 23(b) (3) requires that the
class action be more advantageous, or superior, than alternative
methods of adjudication. 16 In general, securities suits easily satisfy
the superiority requirement as they involve economic injury on a
large number of persons geographically dispersed. 7  The
mon to the class. In re Micron Techs., 247 F.R.D. at 632. Shared legal questions coupled with
minor disparate facts are sufficient, however. Id. The converse is true as well: a common
core of salient facts and disparate legal remedies will satisfy the commonality requirement.
Id.
8. Gene & Gene LLC v. BioPay LLC, 541 F.3d 318, 325 (5th Cir. 2008) (assuming
Rule 23(a) is met). In addition, the typicality prong is met if the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims and defenses of the class. Typicality does not
require that the claims be identical. Lapin, 254 F.R.D. at 175. Last, Rule 23(a) also requires
that the representative parties fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. In re
Micron Techs., 247 F.R.D. at 632. Absent class members must be afforded adequate represen-
tation for ajudgment to be binding. Id. Adequacy requires an inquiry into whether: (1) the
plaintiff's interests are aligned with the interests of the class member and (2) the plaintiffs
attorneys are qualified and able to handle the litigation. Lapin, 254 F.R.D. at 176. Generally,
the purpose of this two-pronged inquiry is to discover conflicts of interest. Id.; see also In re
DVI Sec. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 196, 205 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
10. FED, R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1).
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (2).
12. FED, R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3).
13. Gene & Gene, 541 F.3d at 326-27.
14. Id. at 326.
15. Id.
16. Lapin v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 254 F.R.D. 168, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). This inquiry
involves assessing the interests of the members of the class individually controlling the litiga-
tion, the extent and nature of any litigation already begun, the desirability of concentrating
the litigation, and the likely difficulties to be encountered. Id. at 186-87.
17. Id.
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dispositive issues for securities class actions are often whether
common issues of loss causation or reliance predominate.
B. Proving a Securities Fraud Case and the Elements of
Loss Causation and Reliance
At the class certification stage, the plaintiff must show that each
element of his claim will be satisfied using generalized proof appli-
cable to all class members." Securities fraud actions brought under
§ 10 of the Securities Exchange Act 9 and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission's Rule lOb-520 allow a private plaintiff to
recover damages caused by an act or omission resulting in fraud or
deceit in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 2 To
state a cause of action under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must allege and
prove six elements: (1) that the defendant made a material mis-
representation or omission, (2) that the defendant acted with
18. Id. at 181.
19. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006) ("It shall be unlawful
for any person ... to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public in-
terest or for the protection of investors.").
20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997). Rule lOb-5 is construed to contain an implied private
right of action. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Superinten-
dent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). Chiefjudge Frank
H. Easterbrook of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently im-
plied in a speech on challenges in reading statutes that current judicial philosophy would
have warranted against inferring a private right of action absent a specific legislative direc-
tive to do so; rather, such enforcement should be left to governmental agencies.
If Congress enacts a rule and commits enforcement to an agency, no judge these days
takes the line ofj.l Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), and says: "Well, we could
get more enforcement by creating a private right of action too." If the deal lacks a
private right of action, that's conclusive.
Judges see that laws have both costs and benefits. A private right of action may pro-
duce more of the benefit-but at more cost in litigation, and if litigation leads to
errors then the costs of errors may be high too. A sensible compromise may be to
create a right but limit enforcement to agencies.
Frank H. Easterbrook, ChiefJudge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Dinner
Talk at the Lawyers Club of Chicago: Challenges in Reading Statutes 2-3 (Sept. 26, 2007)
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). But see STEPHEN BREYER,
ACTIVE LIBERTY 81 (Oxford University Press 2008) (2005) (stating that judges should pay
primary attention to a statute's purpose in difficult cases of interpretation in which the lan-
guage is not clear).
21. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
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scienter22 or a wrongful state of mind, (3) that the material misrep-
resentation or omission was made in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security, (4) that the plaintiff relied on the material
misrepresentation, (5) that the plaintiff suffered an economic loss
as a result, and (6) that the material misrepresentation actually
caused the loss.
2
Usually the key to defeating class certification is to show that in-. 24
dividual issues of loss causation or reliance predominate. Loss
causation refers to the direct causal link between the misstatement
and the economic loss, and is an essential element of Rule lOb-5
liability.25 Reliance is also an essential element for Rule 10b-5 liabil-
ity because it proves the requisite causal connection between a
defendant's misrepresentation and the injury. 6 In the Supreme
Court's most recent securities fraud case, Stoneridge, the Court
noted that there are two instances where a rebuttable presumption
of reliance exists: (1) if there is an omission of a material fact by
one with a duty to disclose and (2) if the statements at issue be-
come public.
The presumption of a plaintiff's reliance when the statements at
issue become public is called the "fraud-on-the-market" presump-
tion, or the Basic presumption. The rationale for this rule is that all
22. Scienter is a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.
Ernst &Ernst, 425 U.S. at 185 n.1. Currently, there are three different ways to establish sci-
enter: (1) plaintiffs can state a claim by pleading either (a) motive and opportunity or (b)
strong circumstantial evidence of recklessness or conscious misbehavior, Novak v. Kasaks,
216 F.3d 300, 309-10 (2d Cir. 2000); (2) plaintiffs can state a claim by pleading facts show-
ing (a) simple recklessness or (b) a motive to commit fraud and opportunity, In re Silicon
Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999); and (3) plaintiffs can state a
claim by pleading enough facts that establish altogether a strong inference of scienter, see,
e.g., Ottomann v. Hangar Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 345 (4th Cir. 2003); Helwig
v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 550-52 (6th Cir. 2000). Scienter also must be established with
a "strong inference." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006). The Supreme Court recently clarified
that this strong inference requirement mandates a holistic assessment whereby courts weigh
both culpable and nonculpable inferences on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Tellabs, Inc. v. Ma-
kor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322-24 (2007).
23. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
24. Jonathan Eisenberg, Beyond the Basics: Seventy-five Defenses Securities Litigators Need to
Know, 62 Bus. LAw. 1281, 1297 (2007); see also Ryan v. Flowserve Corp., 245 F.R.D. 560, 567
(N.D. Tex. 2007) (stating that transforming an individual securities fraud action into a class
action through Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance factor hinges on whether the plaintiffs' can
utilize the fraud-on-the-market presumption to establish blanket reliance).
25. Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 341-42; Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534,
549 (5th Cir. 1981). The holding of Dura Pharmaceuticals was codified as an element in the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"). 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (4) (2006).
26. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008) (cit-
ing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972) (presuming fraud
where there is an omission and a duty to disclose); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247
(1988) (presuming fraud under the fraud-on-the-market presumption)).
27. Id.
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public information is reflected in the market price of the security,
and hence it can be assumed that an investor who buys or sells
stock at the market price relies upon false statements made pub-
licly.29 Thus, reliance will be presumed if the plaintiff can show: (1)
that the defendant made public material misstatements, (2) that
the defendant's shares were traded in an efficient market,0 and (3)
that the plaintiffs traded shares between the time the misrepresen-
tations were made and the time the truth was revealed.3 ' This
presumption, however, cuts both ways. Defendants can embrace
the Basic presumption at the class certification stage and later turn
the presumption to their advantage by successfully arguing that the
market was indeed efficient, and thus "reflect[ed] all available in-
formation in securities pricing, including information from
nonissuer sources that questions, contradicts, or corrects the is-
suer's misrepresentation." 2
C. Reaching the Merits to Resolve a Class Certification Motion
Granting class certification is within the discretion of the lower
court, exercised within the constraints of Rule 23 . It is an abuse of
discretion for a lower court to erroneously apply the law to class
certification. 4
The Second Circuit recently joined a majority of the other cir-
cuits by abandoning its requirement that plaintiffs only make
"some showing" of compliance with Rule 23's requirements. 5 Pre-
28. Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-42.
29. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 1323.
30. Whether a market is an "efficient" market depends on certain factors, including:
(1) the average trading volume; (2) the number of securities analysts following the stock;
(3) the number of market makers; (3) whether a company is entitled to file a registration
statement for trading; and (5) certain evidence of a cause and effect relationship between
news and stock-price changes. In re Nature's Sunshine Prods. Inc. Sec. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 656,
662 (D. Utah 2008). The most important factor is whether the plaintiff can empirically
demonstrate that stock prices regularly rose or fell in response to market information. Id. at
663-64.
31. Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 264 (5th Cir.
2007).
32. Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory to Measure Damages in
Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REv. 883, 919 (1990) (citing cases where the fraud-on-
the-market theory has worked against plaintiffs).
33. Oscar Private Equity Invs., 487 F.3d at 264 (citing Gulf Oil v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89,
100 (1981)).
34. Id. (citing Feder v. Elec. Data Sys., 429 F.3d 125, 129 (5th Cir. 2005)).
35. In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 32 (2d Cir. 2006). The district
court in In re Salomon had difficulty discerning the standard of proof in applying Rule 23. In
re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 236 F.R.D. 208, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated, 544 F.3d
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viously, the Second Circuit prohibited the weighing of merits on a
Rule 23 hearing.36 Now, the Second Circuit states that specific Rule
23 requirements must be fully established, regardless whether this
assessment overlaps with the merits,37 and requires a "definitive as-
sessment" of Rule 23 requirements. 3 8 The other circuit courts
generally agree with this approach and require that a court resolve
disputes concerning the facts of the case to determine if certifica-
tion is appropriate.39
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit cautioned that Rule 23 hear-
ings should not extend into protracted mini-trials, stating:
To avoid the risk that a Rule 23 hearing will extend into a pro-
tracted mini-trial of substantial portions of the underlying
litigation, a district judge must be accorded considerable dis-
cretion to limit both discovery and the extent of the hearing
on Rule 23 requirements. But even with some limits on dis-
covery and the extent of the hearing, the district judge must
receive enough evidence, by affidavits, documents, or testi-
mony, to be satisfied that each Rule 23 requirement has been
met.4°
Thus, the emerging view among the circuits is that district courts
must consider evidence which goes to the requirements of Rule 23
even if it affects the underlying merits of the case; the court should
not assess any aspect of the merits unrelated to a Rule 23 require-
ment.41 However, as Part III and Part IV demonstrate, despite the
Second Circuit's concern that motions for class certification should
not progress into mini-trials, securities class plaintiffs are now re-
quired to establish more and more of the merits of their claim at
the Rule 23 stage.
474 (2d Cir. 2008). Ultimately the district court erroneously adopted the "some showing"
standard. Id. at 212.
36. Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, 435 F.3d 219, 232 (2d Cir. 2006).
37. In re Initial Public Offering, 471 F.3d at 33. For a full discussion of the circuit's rela-
tive approach to weighing merits and considering evidence on a motion for class
certification, see Davis, supra note 5.
38. In re Initial Public Offering, 471 F.3d at 41.
39. See, e.g., In re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 6 (lst Cir. 2005); Unger v.
Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2005); Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 575
(8th Cir. 2005); Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004); Newton
v. Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 166-68 (3d Cir. 2001); Szabo v.
Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001); Love v. Turlington, 733 F.2d
1562, 1564 (11th Cir. 1984).
40. In re Initial Public Offering, 471 F.3d at 41.
41. In re Micron Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 247 F.R.D. 627, 633 (D. Idaho 2007).
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III. NEWLY ERECTED BARRIERS REQUIRE CLASS PLAINTIFFS
To ESTABLISH ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THEIR
SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIMS AT THE CLASS
CERTIFICATION STAGE
"To be successful, a securities class-action plaintiff must thread
the eye of a needle made smaller and smaller over the years byju-
dicial decree and congressional action."02 Indeed, the courts are
now in the process of erecting merits barriers to certifying a privateS 43
securities fraud class action. This growing trend requires plaintiffs
to establish more and more of their securities fraud claims on a
Rule 23 hearing. For instance, the Fifth Circuit denies plaintiffs
the reliance presumption in Rule 23 hearings absent a showing of
loss causation by a preponderance of the evidence." The Second
Circuit has similarly followed suit by providing plaintiffs with a reli-
ance presumption, but mandating defendants be given an
opportunity to contest this.45 In essence, what the Second Circuit
gave with one hand, it took back with the other. As this Article
shows, by providing defendants with an opportunity to rebut the
classwide presumption of reliance before class certification, the
Second Circuit has followed the Fifth Circuit's lead in orchestrat-
ing Rule 23 trials on the merits.
A. The Federal Court Trend: Securities Class Action Rule 23
Trials on the Merits
The Fifth and Second Circuits have turned a motion for class
certification into a trial-like forum where plaintiffs are required to
42. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 235 (5th Cir. 2009)
(per curiam with formerJustice O'Connor sitting by special designation).
43. See Coffee & Paulovic, supra note 4, at 196 (discussing the trend of stricter stan-
dards at the Rule 23 stage for securities class actions); see also Matthew L. Mustokoff, Fraud
Not on the Market: Rebutting the Presumption of Classwide Reliance Twenty Years After Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 4 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 225, 226 (2008) ("In a wave of recent decisions, the courts
have made it tougher for plaintiffs to demonstrate that a particular security trades in an
efficient market for purposes of triggering the classwide presumption of reliance.... [A
principal reason for this trend is that] the courts have interpreted Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 23 ... more stringently in recent years."); cf Joanne Doroshow, Gordon GekkoJustice
Makes a Comeback 132 RECORDER 56 (Mar. 21, 2008) (arguing the Supreme Court in Ston-
eridge ushered in an era whereby shareholders are more vulnerable and the integrity of
American markets more exposed than in decades).
44. Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 266 (5th Cir.
2007); see also Alaska Elec. Pension Fund, 572 F.3d at 233-34.
45. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 485 (2d Cir. 2008).
[VOL. 43:2
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prove the merits of their case.46 Oscar imposed a loss causation ob
stacle that plaintiffs have to overcome at the class certification
stage.47 The Second Circuit in In re Salomon added the fraud-on-the-
market presumption to the list as well. While the Second Circuit
provides plaintiffs with an initial presumption of reliance through
the fraud-on-the-market theory, by mandating that defendants be
given an opportunity to rebut this presumption, it has transformed
a Rule 23 hearing into a trial on the reliance issue as well.
1. The Fifth Circuit Increases the Role of Rule 23
Hearings: Loss Causation
Oscar requires that plaintiffs establish loss causation at the class
certification stage. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Oscar applying
the loss causation requirement in class certification is a formidable
obstacle in the way of plaintiffs' class certification. 8
One principal effect of the Oscar decision is to relieve defen-
dants of the burden of rebutting market efficiency .... By
identifying loss causation as a "fraud-on-the-market" prerequi-
site, Oscar shifts the burden to plaintiffs to prove loss causation.
Moreover, the decision requires plaintiffs to come forward with
proof of loss causation on a motion for class certification, ear-
lier than has been typical in fraud-on-the-market cases.49
46. See Oscar Private Equity Invs., 487 F.3d at 266; In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig.,
544 F.3d at 485-86; see also Samuel H. Rudman, 'Oscar': Misinterpretation of Fraud-on-the-
Market Theory, N.Y.L.J.,July 17, 2008, at 3 (stating that Oscar is in direct conflict with control-
ling Supreme Court precedent and erroneously creates a new certification requirement by
placing a burden on plaintiffs to prove the merits of their case before trial).
47. Rudman, supra note 46. Since its inception, the Fifth Circuit has taken Oscar even
further. Originally the Fifth Circuit's decision was understood as applying only to cases of
multiple negative disclosures. See Fener v. Belo Corp., 560 F. Supp. 2d at 506-08 (N.D. Tex.
2008) (applying Oscar's loss causation requirement to a plaintiff's motion for class certifica-
tion and finding a lack of loss causation because not all multiple negative disclosures were
shown to be substantially related to the fraud); David Jacobson, 5th Circuit's 'Oscar' Ruling,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 24, 2007, at 14. However, now the Fifth Circuit has applied this require-
ment to cases of single disclosures as well. Luskin v. Intervoice-Brite, Inc., No. 06-11251,
2008 WL 104273 (5th Cir. Jan. 8, 2008); see also Ryan v. Flowserve Corp., 245 F.R.D. 560,
568-69 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (applying Duras loss causation requirement on a motion for class
certification to a case involving only a single disclosure).
48. Jacobson, supra note 47. The Oscar decision has been referred to as "the penulti-
mate step to repudiation of the fraud-on-the-market presumption." H. Peter Haveles,
'Oscar': Nearing the End of Fraud-on-the-Market Theory?, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 27, 2007, at 4.
49. Jacobson, supra note 47; see also Coffee & Paulovic, supra note 8, at 200 (stating that
while Oscar may not mandate mini-trials, it remains an open question to what extent courts
must go to find Rule 23's requirements to be established).
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a. The Oscar Case and the District Court
Allegiance Telecom Inc. ("Allegiance") was a publicly traded,
national telecommunications company. In April 2001, Allegiance
released its first quarter financial results which indicated that it
had outperformed analysts' estimates, raising the stock price by
nine percent.5' Again in the second and third quarters, Allegiance
released results indicating it surpassed earnings expectations.
Then in February 2002, Allegiance released its fourth quarter fi-
nancial results, which fell short of analysts' earnings estimates."
The stock price then fell twenty-eight percent.
54
Oscar Private Equity Investments filed suit in the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas alleging Allegiance violated §§ 10 (b) and 20 (a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. 5' The plaintiffs
alleged that Allegiance fraudulently misrepresented its line-
installation count in its first three quarterly announcements for
2001.-" As a result, the plaintiffs asserted they purchased Allegiance
shares at an artificially inflated price. 7 When Allegiance released its
correction, the plaintiffs alleged they were injured because of the
resulting stock decline.58
The plaintiffs moved to certify a class of all individuals who pur-
chased Allegiance shares between its first and fourth quarter
releases. 5 The district court certified the class, specifically allowing
the plaintiffs to establish a rebuttable, class-wide presumption of
reliance through the fraud-on-the-market theory. °
b. The Fifth Circuit Modifies the Law
The Fifth Circuit, however, vacated the proposed class "for wont
of any showing that the market reacted to the corrective disclo-
sure."' Instead, the Fifth Circuit insisted that class certification be
50. Oscar Private Equity Invs., 487 F.3d at 262.
51. Id. at 263.
52. Id.
53. Id. Allegiance missed its revenue covenants, which put its credit lines in default, ul-
timately forcing Allegiance into bankruptcy. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 262.





61. Id. at 262. The dissent characterized the majority's holding as a "breathtaking revi-
sion of securities class action procedure that eviscerates Basic's fraud-on-the-market
[VOL. 43:2
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supported by a showing of loss causation.62 The Fifth Circuit ini-
tially noted that the Supreme Court's Basic decision provided the
circuits "room to develop its own fraud-on-the-market rules.
63
Thus, the Fifth Circuit required more than proof of a material mis-
statement; rather, the court required that "the misstatement
actually moved the market."6 According to the court, a plaintiff
must establish loss causation to trigger the fraud-on-the-market
presumption by a preponderance of the evidence.
6 5
The Circuit required: (1) that the misstatement actually move
the market to prove loss causation, (2) that a plaintiff must estab-
lish loss causation in order to be entitled to the fraud-on-the-
market presumption, (3) that the plaintiff must establish this by a
preponderance of the evidence, and (4) that all this must be done
on a motion for class certification.66
The court ruled that the plaintiff must establish loss causation
on a motion for class certification with an opinion primarily driven
by policy concerns. The Fifth Circuit stated, "We cannot ignore the
presumption, creates a split from other circuits by requiring mini-trials on the merits of
cases at the class certification stage, and effectively overrules legitimately binding circuit
precedents." Id. at 272 (DennisJ., dissenting).
62. Id. at 262.
63. Id. at 264 (internal citations omitted).
64. Id. at 265. But see In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 482-83
(2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting this "actually moved" language).
65. Oscar Private Equity Invs., 487 F.3d at 265, 269; Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flow-
serve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 228 (5th Cir. 2009). The Oscarand F/owserve decisions erroneously
conflate reliance and loss causation. As Professor MichaelJ. Kaufman has noted, reliance is
independent of loss causation. MichaelJ. Kaufman, At a Loss: Congress, The Supreme Court and
Causation Under the Federal Securities Laws, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 1, 37 (2005) [hereinafter
Kaufman, At a Loss]. Professor Kaufman states:
[R]eliance-even in a fraud-on-the-market case-is distinct from the element of loss
causation. The Court in Basic declared that plaintiffs must also demonstrate the req-
uisite causal connection between a defendant's misrepresentation and the plaintiff's
injury. The causal connection required is that the defendants' misstatements or omis-
sions created a quantifiable disparity between the transaction price and the true value
of the securities on the date of the transaction. That particular causal connection can
be broken by defendants by showing that the market price would not have been af-
fected by their misrepresentations. Reliance requires proof that defendants'
misrepresentations or omissions influenced plaintiffs' decision whether to invest at
all. As developed by the Supreme Court in Basic, and as ultimately codified by Con-
gress in the PSLRA, loss causation is proof that these misrepresentations or omissions
created a measurable difference between the price which plaintiffs actually paid for
their securities and the price that they would have paid in the absence of those mis-
representations or omissions.
Id. at 38 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
66. Oscar Private Equity Invs., 487 F.3d at 266.
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in terrorem power of certification., 67 According to the court, there
was no "sound reason" to leave the loss causation determination
for a later stage in the litigation because it involves little discovery
and little proof.& "Its 'proof is drawn from public data and public
filings .... It is largely an empirical judgment that can be made [at
class certification] as well as later in the litigation."69 Ultimately the
court, after weighing all the evidence-expert reports both for and
against the plaintiff-decided that the factual conclusion drawn by
the plaintiffs expert was "untenable" and loss causation was not
established.
The dissent in the Oscar decision summarized the majority hold-
ing as a "breathtaking revision of securities class action procedure
that eviscerates Basic's fraud-on-the-market presumption ... [and]
creates a split from other circuits by requiring mini-trials on the
merits of cases at the class certification stage.,
7'
2. The Second Circuit Continues the Trend of Rule 23 Trials:
Reliance and Rebutting the Basic Presumption
In In re Salomon, the Second Circuit was the first to jump on the
Oscar bandwagon.72 While not requiring that plaintiffs initially
come forward with their loss causation and reliance evidence, by
requiring that the defendant be given an opportunity to rebut the
67. Id. at 267. In addition, the Fifth Circuit cited the enactment of the PSLRA as evi-
dence that courts should be mindful of the extraordinary leverage plaintiffs have once they
file a securities class action. Id. Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit subsequently reaffirmed
Oscar's holding but drew attention to a competing and opposing policy of promoting private
rights of action. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund, 572 F.3d at 234-35.
68. Oscar Private Equity Invs., 487 F.3d at 267.
69. Id. This "empirical judgment" is based on an expert's opinion and a properly per-
formed regression analysis. However, a recent study by Esther Bruegger and Frederick
Dunbar of NERA Economic Consulting finds that regression analyses can be exploited to
estimate what the effect of the truth would have been had it been disclosed at the time it was
concealed, and that there comes a point where arbitrary allocations are made. Esther
Bruegger & Frederick C. Dunbar, Estimating Financial Fraud Damages with Response Coefficients,
35 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2009) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
70. Oscar Private Equity Invs., 487 F.3d at 270. The majority found the evidence to be
little more than well-informed speculation. Id. at 271. The plaintiffs expert, according to
the majority, offered only raw opinion of the defendant's expert's analysis without a sup-
porting study of the market at issue. Id. The dissent characterized the court's review as de
novo, as opposed to abuse of discretion, and thus improper. Id. at 272 (Dennis, J., dissent-
ing). The Fifth Circuit's weighing of competing expert reports at this stage illustrates the
Seventh Amendment concerns discussed in Part IV.C.
71. Id.
72. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 485 (2d Cir. 2008) (requir-
ing that defendants be given a chance to rebut the fraud-on-the-market presumption).
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reliance presumption, plaintiffs must eventually set forth their evi-
dence at a Rule 23 hearing. Thus, the practical effect will be the
same: the plaintiffs must establish that they are entitled to the pre-
sumption with persuasive evidence, not merely sufficient evidence.
a. The Grubman Fallout and the District Court Decision
The plaintiffs in In re Salomon brought a securities fraud action
under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 against Citicorp USA, Inc., Salomon
Smith Barney, Inc., Citigroup, Inc., and Smith Barney analyst Jack
Grubman.75 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the
securities laws by issuing and disseminating research analyst reports
on Metromedia that contained materially false and misleading
statements and omissions of material fact to attract business from
Metromedia for Smith Barney's investment banking division.4
This, according to the plaintiffs, would increase Grubman's per-. 71
sonal compensation.
The district court held that, for the research reports issued
between March 8 and July 25, 2001, the complaint pleaded fraud
with sufficient particularity to withstand the defendants' motion to
dismiss.76 The plaintiffs alleged that Grubman's reports omitted or
73. Id. at 476.
74. Id. Securities fraud actions against analysts are not infrequent. Cf Roberta S.
Karmel, When Should Investor Reliance be Presumed in Securities Class Actions?, 63 Bus. LAw 25,
45-47 (2005) (surveying securities fraud actions against analysts).
75. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d at 474. In the late 1990s, telecom-
munications stock underwent explosive growth. Amy Feldman & Joan Caplin, Is Jack
Grubman the Worst Analyst Ever, MONEY MAG., Apr. 25, 2002, http://money.cnn.com/2002/
04/25/pf/investing/grubman/ (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform). However, when this boom went bust, Telecom companies lost more than half a
trillion dollars in market value in less than two years. Id. Jack Grubman, Salomon Smith
Barney's telecom analyst, was at the heart of this debacle. Id. He was pulling in about $20
million a year and was Wall Street's highest paid analyst ever. Id. Some would characterize
him as "the fall guy" for the telecom bust of the late 1990s. Mark Lewis, Jack Grubman, Fall
Guy, FORBES, July 22, 2002, http://www.forbes.com/2002/07/22/0722grubman.html (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Nevertheless, Grubman has
been compared to Michael Miliken, the infamous junk bond trader of the 1980s who was
eventually brought down for insider trading and a variety of other securities laws violations.
Id.
76. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d at 476. The PSLRA requires that a
plaintiff state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-4(b)(2) (2006). One of the allegations the court found insufficient to state scienter
was that Grubman was an extremely influential analyst who could drive up share prices with
positive recommendations. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d at 476-77. While
the allegation is rather conclusory, it nevertheless appears to hold considerable merit. See
Feldman & Caplin, supra note 75 (surveying a variety of industry professionals, one of whom
is quoted as stating that "[w]hen Grubman said wonderful things about a company, it was
like a narcotic-everybody wanted it").
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misstated material facts regarding a credit facility that Citicorp
USA was to provide Metromedia. Metromedia and Citicorp USA
had signed a commitment letter for a $350 million credit facility.78
The plaintiffs alleged, however, that this facility suffered numerous
problems and delays over the next seven months. 79 Despite these
mounting difficulties, Grubman did not reveal the trouble and in-
stead touted the Metromedia-Citicorp USA deal.80 The court
determined that Grubman became obligated to reveal this infor-
mation when he chose to provide some information about the
credit facility.
8'
The plaintiffs then moved to certify a class of plaintiffs who
bought Metromedia stock during this time. 2 The district court
granted the plaintiffs' motion, finding that the class satisfied both
Rule 23 (a) and 23 (b)'s requirements. 3 The plaintiffs brought their
motion for class certification under Rule 23(b) (3), which requires
that questions of fact and law predominate over any questions af-
fecting individual members. 4  The defendants, offering no
evidence or expert testimony, contended that the individual ques-
tions of reliance would predominate, thus making class
certification improper.5 The plaintiffs then invoked the fraud-on-
the-market presumption to demonstrate class-wide reliance.8 6 The
77. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d at 477.
78. Id. A credit facility is a type of loan made in a business context. Credit facilities in-
clude revolving credit, term loans, committed facilities, letters of credit, and retail credit
accounts.
79. Id. at 477.
80. Id. The district court found that Grubman was aware of this due to his numerous
breaches of Smith Barney's Chinese Wals. Id. One commentator noted that if an investor
acted on each of Grubman's buy recommendations and sold when he downgraded the
stock, the investor would have suffered a 74.5 percent loss. Feldman & Caplin, supra note 75.
The article fittingly questions whether Grubman "is the worst analyst ever?" Id. Another
reporter recants Gnbman's "bullish" behavior at WorldCom where he kept his buy rating
on the stock until just a few days before the company announced an enormous accounting
misstatement forcing it into bankruptcy. Gretchen Morgenson, Barred Ex-Analyst is Hired by
Small Digital Developer, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2004, at C2.
81. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d at 477.
82. Id. at 476-78.
83. Id. at 476.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 478. The plaintiffs presented two alternative arguments to the defendants' re-
liance-based challenge: (1) because the case involves omissions, they are relieved altogether
of the obligation to prove reliance or (2) even if reliance is required for their claim, reliance
by all class members may be presumed under the Basic presumption. In re Salomon Analyst
Metromedia Litig., 236 F.R.D. 208, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The district court disagreed with
the plaintiffs argument that reliance was not required. Id. The district court held that the
allegations did not present a case primarily involving a failure to disclose and therefore the
plaintiffs were not in a difficult position to prove reliance on a mere non-disclosure. Id. at
219.
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defendants retorted that the presumption could not be invoked in
actions against research analysts.87 The district court, however, ap-
plied the presumption.88 The district court found that the three
required elements of the fraud-on-the-market presumption were all
met as well. 89 However, the district court refused to allow the de-
fendants an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence until a later
stage in the litigation.9
b. The Second Circuit Gives Defendants the Chance to Respond
The Second Circuit was faced with three issues on appeal: (1)
whether the fraud-on-the-market presumption applies to suits
against analysts or other non-issuers, (2) whether plaintiffs must
make a heightened showing that misrepresentations had an "actual
impact on market price" to invoke the fraud-on-the-market pre-
sumption, and (3) whether the defendants must be afforded an
opportunity to rebut the fraud-on-the-market presumption before
class certification. 9'
i. The Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption Applies to Non-Issuers
Relying heavily on the Supreme Court's Basic decision, the Sec-
ond Circuit rejected the argument that the fraud-on-the-market
presumption applies only to issuers. The court reasoned that:
[T]he Basic Court did not so limit its holding and its logic
counsels against doing so. The reason is simple: the premise
of Basic is that, in an efficient market, share prices reflect "all
publicly available information, and, hence, any material mis-
representations." It thus does not matter, for purposes of
establishing entitlement to the presumption, whether the
87. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d at 478. The defendants likewise op-
posed certification, arguing that proposed representatives were inadequate and atypical. In
re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 236 F.R.D. at 211.
88. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d at 478.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 479.
91. Id. at 480.
92. Id. at 481.
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misinformation was transmitted by an issuer, an analyst, or
anyone else.93
In addition, the Second Circuit invoked the controversial" Ston-
eridge decision to maintain that the fraud-on-the-market
presumption applies if the deceptive acts were communicated to
the public, regardless of the speaker's position in the company.
9
5
ii. A Heightened Showing Is Not Required: Rejecting Oscar?
Second, the Second Circuit addressed "whether plaintiffs alleg-
ing securities fraud against research analysts must make a
heightened evidentiary showing in order to benefit from the fraud-
on-the-market presumption."96 The defendants argued that the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the misrepresentations had a meas-
urable effect on the stock price.97 The Second Circuit disagreed,
holding that the question of materiality must be viewed by a "rea-
sonable investor" standard rather than in terms of "actual impact
on the market price."99 The court stated the concept as follows:
93. Id. (internal citations omitted); see also In re Credit Suisse-AOL Sec. Litig., 253
F.R.D. 17, 28-29 (D. Mass. 2008) (applying Basic to a 10b-5 action against an analyst).
94. 26A MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, The Polarized Debate, in SECURITIES LITIGATION: DAM-
AGES § 15:7:07 (2008) [hereinafter KAUFMAN, SECURITIES LITIGATION] (surveying the
discourse surrounding Stoneridgeas the good, the bad, and the ugly).
95. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d at 481-82. The Supreme Court in
Stoneridge effectively abrogated secondary liability, reasoning that plaintiffs could not estab-
lish reliance. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008).
However, some anticipate that Congress will take legislative action to reverse certain Su-
preme Court decisions, including Stoneridge. Posting of Ted Allen to RiskMetrics Group Risk
& Governance Blog, http://blog.riskmetrics.com/2008/12/what-can-investors-expect_
in.2.html (Dec. 8, 2008) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform);
see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Zvika Neeman, Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics 32
(Harv. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 603, 2008) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030355 (stating that investor protection will be higher following
scandals or crashes that make the problems of insider opportunism more salient). For a full
discussion of the Stoneridge decision, see Barbara Black, Stoneridge Investment Partners v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.: Reliance on Deceptive Conduct and the Future of Securities Fraud Class
Actions, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 330 (2008).
96. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d at 476. The Second Circuit noted
that it was poised to address this issue earlier in 2004 in Hevesi v. Citigroup, Inc., 366 F.3d 70
(2d Cir. 2004), but that appeal was never heard on its merits.
97. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d at 482.
98. Id. at 482-83. A plaintiff can demonstrate fraud actually moved the stock price by
showing either (1) an increase in price after the release of a false positive news or (2) a de-
crease in stock price after a corrective disclosure. See Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d
400, 418-19 (5th Cir. 2001).
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[I]f plaintiffs can show that the alleged misrepresentation was
material and publicly transmitted into a well-developed mar-
ket, then reliance will be presumed, for if a reasonable
investor would think that the information would have signifi-
cantly altered the total mix of information, ... then it may be
presumed that, in an efficient market, investors would have
taken the omitted information into account, thereby affecting
market price .... 9
Thus rejecting Oscas overall holding, the Second Circuit held that
the burden is properly placed on the defendants at the rebuttal
stage and not on the plaintiffs.0 0 To hold otherwise, according to
the Second Circuit, would eviscerate the presumption of reliance.0 '
The defendants also argued that a heightened standard was
necessary to deter frivolous suits against non-issuers. 102 The court
rejected this argument, reasoning that that there were already suf-
ficient safeguards in place to prevent plaintiffs from suing any
person who makes public statements about a company.0 3 For in-
stance, the court noted that the materiality requirement, the fact
that defendants can rebut the presumption of reliance, and the
fact that predictions or opinions are generally not actionable all act
as safeguards against vexatious litigation. 4
99. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d at 483 (internal citations and quo-
tations omitted).
100. Id. at 485. However, lower courts have begun to confuse In re Salomon with Oscar.
See, e.g., In re Metro. Sec. Litig., No. CV-04-25-FVS, 2008 WL 5102303, at *2 n.2 (E.D. Wash.
Nov. 25, 2008) (citing Salomon and stating that "[t]he defendants have made the decision to
wait until later to litigate loss causation.").
101. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d at 483.
102. Id. at 484. "The structure of this analysis does not vary according to the identity of
the speaker." Id. However, the court noted an important caveat to this broad statement: the
identity of the speaker may be significant in that it effects what a reasonable investor would
rely upon. Id. at 484 n.8. For instance, it is clearly reasonable to rely on misstatements made
by the CEO of the defrauding company, while the same is not true about relying on state-
ments made by a relatively obscure comment posted on a website.
103. Id. at 484. The defendants phrased their fear as, "if no heightened test is applied in
suits against non-issuers, any person who posts material misstatements about a company on
the internet could end up a defendant in a Rule lOb-5 action." Id.
104. Id. at 484. One commentator has identified over seventy-five defenses available in a
securities fraud action. See Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 1281-83. Thus, one thing the defense
bar need not worry about is the absence of any colorable defense.
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iii. The Defendants Must Be Afforded an Opportunity to Rebut
the Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption: Embracing the
Rule 23 Trial Trend?
Finally, the Second Circuit mandated that trial courts make a
"definitive assessment" of the Rule 23 requirements.'0 5 This re-
quires that the court consider all evidence and resolve factual
disputes. 6 While the Second Circuit cautioned that a Rule 23 hear-
ing should not extend into a mini-trial, it nevertheless required
that the court receive enough "evidence, by affidavits, documents,
or testimony, to be satisfied that each Rule 23 requirement has
been met."'0 7 The In re Salomon court effectively held that this de-
finitive assessment could not be made without determining
whether the defendants can rebut the presumption at the class cer-
tification stage.' 8 A successful rebuttal defeats class certification. '09
Despite the fact that there was "no dispute," that the market was
efficient, and that the statements were public, the Second Circuit
still required that the defendant be given a chance to refute the
presumption."0 Ultimately, because the court failed to afford the
defendants a chance to rebut the presumption, the Second Circuit
vacated class certification and remanded."'
B. The Significance of Loss Causation and an Opportunity to
Rebut the Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption
Generally, the key to defeating class certification is to show that
individual issues of reliance or loss causation predominate.12 Reli-
ance and loss causation are essential elements for § 10(b) and Rule
105. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d at 484.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 486 (internal citation omitted).
108. Id. at 485.
109. Id. The Second Circuit cited Oscar to support the proposition that because a de-
fendant's rebuttal will defeat certification, the court must afford the defendant an
opportunity to rebut the presumption before class certification. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 486. The court noted that even though the defendants did not have or offer
any evidence, that error may have been the result of confusion over the law, and should not
be held against them. Id. at 485.
112. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 1297; see also Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance
Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 270 (5th Cir. 2007) (contesting the validity of the expert's re-
port to establish loss causation); Ryan v. Flowserve Corp., 245 F.R.D. 560, 567 (N.D. Tex.
2007) (stating that transforming an individual securities fraud action into a class action
through Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance factor hinges on whether the plaintiffs' can utilize
the fraud-on-the-market presumption to establish blanket reliance).
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lOb-5 liability because they establish the requisite causal connec-
tion between a defendant's misrepresentation and the injury.1
In re Salomon has continued Oscars overall trend of transforming
motions for class certification into trials on the merits. Oscar flatly
required a plaintiff to establish loss causation by a preponderance
of the evidence and In re Salomon further required that courts actu-
ally resolve contested issues concerning reliance at the class
certification stage. By requiring that trial courts give the defendant
an opportunity to respond, In re Salomon has in practice converted
the fraud-on-the-market presumption into a bursting bubble pre-
sumption at the class certification stage.
1. Resolving the Battle of the Experts to Determine
Reliance and Loss Causation
The Second Circuit and the Fifth Circuit require that courts de-
finitively assess Rule 23 issues."4 This definitive assessment requires
the resolution of contested issues of fact. 1 Defendants commonly
contest issues of reliance and loss causation through expert testi-
mony. 16 The Second Circuit has now mandated that defendants be
given a chance to do this at class certification;" 7 the Fifth Circuit
requires a plaintiff to establish loss causation by a preponderance of
the evidence at class certification."' Thus, in the battle of the experts
that will inevitably result, the plaintiffs must establish that their
evidence of reliance and loss causation relating to the fraud-on-the-
market presumption is not just sufficient, but persuasive at the class
certification stage."'
113. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008) (cit-
ing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (presuming fraud where
there is an omission and a duty to disclose); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)
(presuming fraud under the fraud-on-the-market presumption)).
114. Oscar Private Equity Invs., 487 F.3d at 268; In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471
F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006).
115. In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d at 41.
116. MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, Class Certification Proceedings Involving Securities Fraud Experts,
in EXPERT WITNESSES: SECURITIES CASES § 3:5 (2008); see also I JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN,
MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 3:13 (5th ed. 2009).
117. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 486 (2d Cir. 2008).
118. Oscar Private Equity Invs., 487 F.3d at 269; Rudman, supra note 46, at 8 ("Oscar fo-
cuses less on whether the requirements of Rule 23 can be met and, instead, turns class
certification into a determination of whether loss causation can be proved.").
119. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d at 480 (citing Heerwagen v. Clear
Channel Commc'ns, 435 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006)). A plaintiffs failure to rebut a defendant's
expert may result in the court denying the plaintiff the benefit of the fraud-on-the-market
presumption. See In reZonagen, Inc. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 764, 781 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
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In particular, the In re Salomon court was not faced with whether
the market was efficient-something the plaintiff must show before
he is entitled to the fraud-on-the-market presumption. 120 Rather,
the question before the court was one of causation. 12 The Second
Circuit muddied two distinct inquiries: (1) whether the plaintiff
may take advantage of the presumption of reliance and (2)
whether the plaintiff has proven reliance. 22 This confusion is prob
lematic because only the former is needed for class certification. 23
However, the Second Circuit required that the defendant be given
an opportunity to rebut the latter issue at class certification.2 4 This
explicit directive for courts to engage in the battle of the experts
contravenes the longstanding and traditional deference courts
have employed in considering expert submissions on class certifica-
tion.125
2. Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption: A Bursting Bubble
Theory at the Rule 23 Stage
Under the Fifth Circuit's "preponderance of the evidence" and
the Second Circuit's "required opportunity to respond" ap-
proaches, the fraud-on-the-market presumption has been
converted into a weak "bursting bubble" presumption. Once the
defendant offers some evidence to rebut the presumption of the
fraud-on-the-market theory, the presumption disappears and the
plaintiff must then come forward with enough evidence for the
court to conclude that the plaintiff has satisfied Rule 23.126 Given
that defendants usually attempt to rebut this presumption regard-
120. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d at 485 (stating that there was "no
dispute that [the] stock was actively traded on an open, developed, and generally efficient
securities market" and that it was beyond "any dispute that the alleged misrepresentations
were publicly made." (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
121. Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier, Inc., No. 05-CV-
01898, 2006 WL 2161887, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2006).
122. Id. at *9.
123. Id. The availability of the fraud-on-the-market theory is not a merits inquiry; reli-
ance is. Id.
124. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d at 485.
125. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 116 (stating that "[c]ourts have long approached their
consideration of expert submissions on class certification with substantial restraint.").
126. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d at 486. A bursting bubble theory
holds that once the presumed facts have been contradicted, the presumption disappears.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 211 (8th ed. 1999); see also Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance
Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 274 (5th Cir. 2007) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (stating that giving
the defendant the right of rebuttal recharacterizes the Basic presumption as a " ' bursting
bubble' presumption, e.g., one that 'disappears if anything to the contrary is placed before
the court.'" (citation omitted)).
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less whether the plaintiff offers evidence in support of the Basic
presumption, the plaintiff must in practice come forward with
enough evidence to persuade.12' Thus, just as Oscar requires that the
plaintiff first establish loss causation by a preponderance of the
evidence at the Rule 23 stage, Salomon has the practical effect of re-
quiring a plaintiff to overcome the defendant's evidence and
establish the fraud-on-the-market presumption at the Rule 23
stage.128
IV. THIS JUDICIAL TREND IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS, SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT, AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
As this Part shows, the trend of creating Rule 23 merits trials im-
pedes the litigation of meritorious securities fraud cases. This
judicial design is inconsistent with the federal securities laws,125
contradictory to applicable Supreme Court precedent,30 and in-
compatible with the Seventh Amendment right to ajury trial.3
127. See Ross v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., No. 2:05-cv-819, 2008 WL 4059873, at *2-4
(S.D. Ohio, Aug. 26,2008).
128. As two coauthors explain, the "split" between the Second and Fifth Circuits is illu-
sory:
Although the burden of showing no price impact in the Second Circuit is on defen-
dants, both sides will be forced to address loss causation in detail at the class
certification stage. Inevitably, defendants will rely on experts armed with event stud-
ies in order to sever the link between the misrepresentation and the price of the
security in issue, essentially disproving loss causation as would normally be done at
the summary judgment or trial stage.
Faced with such evidence, plaintiffs will clearly need to present their own evidence
that the misrepresentations in issue did move the market in order to avoid losing the
fraud-on-the-market presumption.
Jamie A. Levitt & Michael Gerard, Loss Causation at Class Certification: Illusory Circuit Split,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 5, 2008, at 4, 6.
129. See infra Part IV.A (arguing that the federal court trend is inconsistent with the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act).
130. See infra Part IV.B (demonstrating that the Supreme Court's decisions in Eisen and
Basic preclude resolution of loss causation and reliance at the Rule 23 stage).
131. See infra Part IV.C (showing how resolving issues of loss causation and reliance at
the Rule 23 stage denies parties their Seventh Amendment right to have issues decided by a
jury and may implicate collateral estoppel issues as well).
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A. Merits Trials at Class Certification are Inconsistent
With the Federal Securities Laws
Securities fraud class actions brought under Rule lOb-5 allow a
private plaintiff to recover damages caused by an act or omission
resulting in fraud or deceit in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.132 However, in the 1990s, Congress perceived a
threat to the stability of the American financial markets from these
Rule lOb-5 actions and, in response, passed the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA").' 33
Through the enactment of the PSLRA, Congress sought to en-
courage the voluntary disclosure of information by corporate
issuers, empower investors rather than their lawyers, and encour-
age plaintiffs' lawyers to pursue valid claims.1 34  Specifically,
Congress wanted to encourage valid claims, but prevent in terrorem
settlements. 135 In terrorem settlements are settlements a defendant
enters into for fear of costly litigation.
1 36
To prevent in terrorem settlements and curb perceived abuses of
the lOb-5 action,1 17 Congress imposed a variety of procedural barri-
132. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997). The majority of securities fraud claims are brought
under Rule lOb-5. Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, SEC Rule lOb-5 and its New Statute
of Limitations: The Circuits Defy the Supreme Court, 51 Bus. LAW. 309, 310 (1996).
133. In 1994, when the Republicans won control of Congress, they passed the PSLRA as
part of their "Contract with America." ALSTON & BIRD, LLP, Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act-Major Developments and Issues, in SECURITIES LITIGATION: FORMS AND ANALYSIS § 1:2
(Thomson West 2009).
134. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683; Stephen
J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 598, 600 (2007). It is generally accepted that private causes of action further the
integrity of American markets. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as re-
printed in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731 (saying the overriding purpose of the Nation's
securities laws is to protect investors and maintain confidence in the market so national
savings and investments may grow for the benefit of all). See generally H.R. REP. No. 105-803
(1998) (Conf. Rep.) (Congressional finding that securities regulation has a dual aim of
protecting investors and promoting growth of financial markets).
135. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 6 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685 ("The
dynamics of private securities litigation create powerful incentives to settle .... Many such
actions are brought on the basis of their settlement value. The settlement value to defen-
dants turns more on the expected costs of defense than the merits of the underlying
claim.").
136. In terrorem is Latin meaning "in order to frighten." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 839
(8th ed. 1999).
137. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 320 (2007); see KAUFMAN,
SECURITIES LITIGATION, supra note 94, § 3:1 (noting that the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act had parallel effects on both the Securities Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of
1933, impacting areas such as class action litigation, forward-looking statements, pleading
requirements, RICO liability, and auditor disclosures); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 37
(1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 736 ("The cost of discovery often
forces innocent parties to settle frivolous securities class actions."); Michael A. Perino, Did
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 913, 915 (saying the three
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ers to securities fraud actions, including a heightened pleading
requirement. 38 Congress did not, however, enact any barrier to
class certification. As this Part shows, a heightened standard for
class certification is contrary to the PSLRA because: (1) numerous
other procedural provisions, contained in both the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the PSLRA, address the in terrorem threat and
abusive practices, and (2) Congress addressed securities class ac-
tions in the PSLRA, and refrained from implementing any
heightened class certification standard despite being capable of
doing so. This evidences Congress's intent not to apply a height-
ened standard.
1. Other Procedural and PSLRA Provisions Address
In Terrorem Threats and Abusive Practices
The Supreme Court and Congress have already enacted and en-
dorsed mechanisms to address the costs of securities litigation and
the concern of in terrorem securities class actions. A heightened se-
curities class certification standard is not among them.
First, the securities class action procedure, absent heightened
class certification, provides a defendant ample defenses against a
securities claim. At the pleading stage, Congress heightened the
standard by requiring that the plaintiff allege a "strong inference"
of scienter. 139 This has proven to be an increasingly potent defense
after the Supreme Court's decision in Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, where defendants can challenge whether a plaintiffs allega-
tions give rise to a strong inference of scienter with a 12(b) (6)
motion and the lower courts must weigh both culpable and non-
culpable inferences. The lower federal courts have since used
goals of the PSLRA are: (1) to reduce the costs that securities actions impose on the capital
markets by discouraging the filing of non-meritorious suits, (2) reducing litigation risk for
high technology issuers, and (3) reducing the race to the courthouse door whereby class
actions are filed soon after a significant stock price declines). But see Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 332
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing the report of a single committee of a single House does not
express the will of Congress).
138. See Perino, supra note 137, at 925 (noting that the pleading requirement actually
has three components: (1) a specificity requirement, (2) a particularity requirement for
complaints pled on information and belief, and (3) the strong inference requirement).
139. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2) (2006).
140. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324; John M. Wunderlich, Note, Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd.: The Weighing Game, 39 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 613, 662-70 (2008) (showing that
Tellabs will result in the increased dismissal of securities fraud claims because it unjustifiably
heightens the pleading requirement); see also In re ProQuest Sec. Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 728,
747 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (stating Tellabs requires "a mini-trial on the merits"). One prominent
securities litigator has stated that his firm spent $150,000just on a single response to a mo-
tion to dismiss. Terry Carter, How Lauwyers Enabled the Metdown and How They Might Have
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Tellabs to perform a mini-trial on the merits at the 12(b) (6) stage.14'
In addition to this heady 12(b) (6) weapon, the defense can easily
later seek decertification if additional facts come out during dis-
covery.12 Even at the trial stage, a defendant can move for summary
judgment and for judgment as a matter of law. 43 In fact, the major-
ity of dismissals are granted between the first ruling on a motion to
dismiss, but before a ruling on summary judgment.'" All these pro-
cedural devices remove the resolution of the case from the jury's
discretion and serve to weed out meritless claims.
Second, prudent defense attorneys have a variety of cost-saving
mechanisms that they should employ. For instance, Congress en-
acted a stay of discovery provision in the PSLRA, which enables
courts to stay discovery pending a 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss.
45
Aggressive use of case management facilitates pre-trial disposi-
Prevented It, A.B.A.J., Jan. 2009, at 34, 38 (quoting ElliottJ. Weiss, law professor and counsel
to Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann). Tellabs' standard has been recognized as "the
new summary judgment" which is eroding the civil jury trial. Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion
to Dismiss is Now Unconstitutional 92 MINN. L. REv. 1851, 1890 (2008) [hereinafter Thomas,
Motion to Dismiss). In addition, in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly the Supreme Court recently abro-
gated Conley v. Gibson's "no set of facts" language and required that a plaintiff set forth
enough factual matter to make the plaintiff's allegation plausible. 550 U.S. 544, 556-59
(2007). The new Bell Atlantic standard is a pragmatic standard, aimed at effective case man-
agement and controlling the threat of in terrorem settlement. RICHARD A. POSNER, How
JUDGES THINK 53-54 (2008).
141. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. Markedly, Cornerstone Research re-
ports that among class actions resolved between 1996 and 2008, forty-one percent had been
dismissed. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS-2008: A YEAR IN
REVIEW 16 (2008) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform), available
at http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/YIR2008.
142. See Ross v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., No. 05 Civ. 819, 2008 WL 4059873, at *2-4
(S.D. Ohio, Aug. 26, 2008). Likewise, parties can appeal the class certification decision un-
der Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
143. FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (summary judgment); FED. R. Civ. P. 50 (judgment as a matter
of law).
144. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 141, at 16.
145. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006). Along the same lines, the federal rules inher-
ently provide judges with broad discretion to manage discovery. See FED. R- Civ. P. 26(a).
Perhaps a better approach to discovery control would be for courts to vigorously analyze
whether these requests violate Rule I I's requirement that the motion is not "presented for
any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of
litigation." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b)(1) (emphasis added); FED. R. Civ. P. 37; FDIC v. Maxxam,
Inc., 523 F.3d 566, 589 (5th Cir. 2008) (stating that a court is empowered to sanction a party
who prosecutes a case in a manner to delay and increase the costs of defense pursuant to its
inherent power, Rule 11, and Rule 37); see alsoJim McElhaney, The Judicial Counter-Punch,
A.B.A.J., Oct. 2008, at 28, 29 (illustrating a trial court's effective use of Rule 11 to curb frivo-
lous discovery). Moreover, changing the judicial approach to discovery sanctions from
sanctioning only the most disgusting and despicable litigation conduct to sanctioning even
boorish and wasteful conduct may effectuate a change in discovery practice. Charles Yablon,
Essay, Stupid Lawyer Tricks: An Essay on Discovery Abuse, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1618, 1641 (1996).
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tion.4 6 Defendants should take advantage of this and propose rea-
sonable discovery schedules and stage limitations.
Third, Congress also enacted specific provisions in the PSLRA to
alleviate the concern of in terrorem settlement. For example, in ad-
dition to heightened pleading and a discovery stay, the PSLRA
requires courts to engage in a Rule 11 review to sanction and dis-
courage those that file frivolous claims. 47 The PSLRA also replaced
joint and several liability with a proportionate liability scheme to
alleviate pressures to settle.
148
Despite these options, one would likely respond that litigation
still exposes defendants to the risk that a jury will fail to recognize
the frivolity of the plaintiffs claim and come down against the
law-abiding corporate defendant. 149 This argument ignores the
abundance of defenses, both legal and procedural, defendants
146. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability
Crisis," and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments ?, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 982, 1006 (2003). Arthur Miller even posits that there is a synergistic relationship be-
tween Rule 16 conferences to clarify factual and legal issues and Rule 56 orders for summary
judgment. Id. at 1006-07.
147. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(1)-(2) (2006). This provision, however, is currently underuti-
lized; courts should engage in a more thorough review, impose sanctions, as well as fee
shifting, to combat any economic incentive to file frivolous suits. Wunderlich, supra note
140, at 668-69.
148. Denis T. Rice, A Practitioner's View of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
31 U.S.F. L. REV. 283, 295 (1997).
149. See Evans, supra note 3, at 36 ("Class actions can put a gun to the head of compa-
nies. Maybe the company will win, but maybe they will get a verdict that will kill them.");
ROBERT E. LITAN, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE INSTIT. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THROUGH
THEIR EYES: How FOREIGN INVESTORS VIEW AND REACT TO THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 13
(2007) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/getilr .doc.php?id=1059 (stating that "some defendants
can feel financially pressured to settle even if they have done nothing wrong, believing it not
to be worth betting their companies on a subsequent mistaken jury verdict that can be diffi-
cult to overturn on an appeal."). Certainly our nation's founders did not express such
distrust of ourjury system. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see alsoJOHN GUINTHER, THEJURY IN
AMERICA 30 (1988) (discussing the importance of the jury as a bedrock of our governmental
structure). In addition, securities fraud trials are extraordinarily rare. STEPHANIE PLANCICH
& SVETLANA STARYKH, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, 2008 TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS AC-
TIONS 7 (2008) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform), available at
http://www.nera.com/image/Recent.Trends_.Report_12-08.pdf ("[O]nly four of the cases
filed in 2000 have gone to trial, and all settled with at least one defendant during the trial.").
In fact, securities fraud class actions go to verdict so seldom that damage issues prove to be
novel and difficult. See Jeffrey M. Goldman, Avoiding Blurred Lines: The Computation of Dam-
ages in Rule lOb-5 Securities Class Action Lawsuits in the Ninth Circuit and a Proposal for a More
Sensible System, 2 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 261, 261-62 (2006). Moreover, "lack of faith in jury
capability is based on untested (and somewhat elitist) assumptions about lay people and
would require case-by-case line drawing that would be burdensome, if not impossible, and
subject the jury trial right to the subjective judgments of individual judges." Miller, supra
note 146, at 1106.
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have in a securities action."5° In fact, one commentator has been
able to catalogue over seventy-five distinct defenses to a securities
claim.15 Even further, if the defendant goes to trial, the plaintiff
must establish all the elements of his claim by a preponderance of
the evidence; the defense has a legitimate chance at defending
against liability.152 It is interesting to note that the last time a plain-
tiff procured a securities class action verdict was seven years ago, in
2002.113 Thus, the risk that jurors will run amok is an insufficient
basis to justify imposing a rigorous class certification standard
whereby plaintiffs must establish loss causation and defendants
must be afforded opportunity for rebuttal of reliance.
154
2. Congress Did Not Establish a Heightened Class
Certification Standard in the PSLRA
Had Congress wished to heighten the class certification standard
under the PSLRA, it would have done so.' 5 However, Congress re-
150. See Evans, supra note 3, at 3. However, Evans argues that these safeguards work
poorly in practice. Id. at 4. Nevertheless, Evans' statement was made in 2002, prior to the
Supreme Court's Tellabs decision which has recently been interpreted as requiring a mini-
trial on the merits at the Rule 12(b) (6) stage. In re ProQuest Sec. Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 728,
747 (E.D. Mich. 2007). In addition, since Tellabs, the ability of plaintiffs to get access to in-
ternal company information has been severely undercut by the circuit courts' recent "steep
discountenance" of confidential informants at the 12(b)(6) stage as well. Michael J. Kauf-
man & John M. Wunderlich, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Proper Role of Confidential
Informants in Securities Fraud Litigation, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 345 (2008); see also Mizzaro v. Home
Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 1239 (11th Cir. 2008) (rejecting a per se discounting of confi-
dential witnesses, but stating the court had reasons to be skeptical of confidential witnesses);
Ley v. Visteon Corp., 540 F.3d 376, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing the Seventh Circuit's "steep
discountenance per se" approach to confidential witnesses favorably). Thus, these proce-
dural devices can no longer be cursorily dismissed as ineffectual.
151. SeeEisenberg, supra note 24, at 1281-83.
152. Lyle Roberts, Not so Fast, THE lOB-5 DAILY, Aug. 5, 2008, http://www.the10b-
5daily.com/archives/000944.html (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform) (noting that the defense bar is on a winning streak in securities class actions).
153. Plancich & Starykh, supra note 149, at 8. Plaintiffs won a verdict on January 16,
2008 in the Apollo Group securities fraud litigation, but this verdict was overturned on Au-
gust 4, 2008. Id.
154. Indeed, there are very persuasive policy concerns that actually weigh in favor of
class certification. See Evans, supra note 3, at 4 (stating that the four major benefits of class
actions include: (1) a reduction of litigation costs; (2) an increased deterrent effect; (3)
economization ofjudicial resources; and (4) affording a convenient method for defendants
to settle large numbers of related claims); see alsoJoseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1167 (10th
Cir. 2000) (stating that Rule 23 encourages judicial economy by eliminating the need for
potential class members to file individual claims).
155. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2) (2006) ("In any private action arising under this chap-
ter in which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant
acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omis-
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frained from enhancing the barrier to class certification in the
PSLRA. Instead, the PSLRA implemented numerous other compre-
hensive class action reforms to address concerns. 56 For example,
Congress made the following changes as they pertain to securities
class actions:
* Lead plaintiffs must show independence from class
action attorneys.
1 5 7
* The first plaintiff to file a class action complaint
must provide notice to members of the purported
class within twenty days.
158
* Within ninety days of notice, the court must con-
sider and resolve motions by class members to serve
as the lead plaintiff.'59
* Once a lead plaintiff is selected, the lead plaintiff
may select and retain class counsel subject to the
court's approval.' 60
* Class members must receive notice of any settle-
ment which includes the amount of the proposed
settlement distribution determined in the aggregate
and on an average per share basis.
16'
* The selected class counsel must identify and explain
fees and expenses to be included in the settle-
ment.
162
sion alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." (emphasis added)).
156. Rice, supra note 148, at 329-35.
157. Lead plaintiffs must disavow having purchased the securities at the direction of
plaintiff's counsel to participate in the class action. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (2). Additionally, no
person can be a lead plaintiff in more than five securities class actions during any three-year
period without the express permission of the court. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (a) (3) (B) (vi) (2006)
("Except as the court may otherwise permit, consistent with the purposes of this section, a
person may be a lead plaintiff, or an officer, director, or fiduciary of a lead plaintiff, in no
more than 5 securities class actions brought as plaintiff class actions pursuant to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure during any 3-year period.").
158. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (a) (3) (A); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (A).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (i) ("Not later than 90 days after the date on which a
notice is published.., the court shall consider any motion made by a purported class mem-
ber in response to the notice, including any motion by a class member who is not
individually named as a plaintiff in the complaint or complaints, and shall appoint as lead
plaintiff the member ... of the purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be
most capable of adequately representing the interests of class members.. ").
160. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v) ("The most adequate plaintiff shall, subject to the
approval of the court, select and retain counsel to represent the class.").
161. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(7).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (7) (C).
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Despite Congress's comprehensive attention to the securities class
action, it is telling that Congress did not change the class certifica-
tion standard.
Moreover, "the PSLRA enacts significant, heightened pleading
requirements for private securities fraud claims," 161 yet a height-
ened class certification standard or an alteration of Rule 23 is not
among them. "The statute requires plaintiffs to allege with particu-
larity defendants' misrepresentations and omissions, together with
a statement of reasons why they are misleading. In addition, the
statute requires plaintiffs to plead with particularity facts which give
rise to a 'strong inference' that defendants made their misstate-
ments or omissions with the requisite state of mind. ' 64 These
heightened standards do not mention class certification, loss causa-
tion, or reliance at all. More importantly, the loss causation section
of the PSLRA refers only to the burden of proof at trial.165 Thus,
the statutory canon of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius
compels the conclusion. This canon has been used quite authorita-
tively by those interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.66
Congress's expression of a heightened standard for pleading sci-
enter implies the exclusion of a heightened standard for loss
causation and reliance. It is plain that Congress did not intend to
heighten the securities class certification standard.167 Instead, alter-
native procedures were a sufficient safeguard for frivolous claims
while preserving plaintiffs' ability to bring meritorious suits. How-
ever, the judicial decision to raise the class certification standard
has made it easier for defendants to mislead investors, thwarting
the primary goal of the securities laws-implementing a philoso-
phy of full disclosure.'6
163. Kaufman, At a Loss, supra note 65, at 21-22.
164. Id. at 22.
165. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (4).
166. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (using the canon of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius to
refine the liberal pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) and the heightened pleading re-
quirements of Rule 9(b)).
167. Not only did Congress specifically refrain from heightening the loss causation
pleading standard, but the Supreme Court in Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336
(2005), also refrained from doing so. See Matthew L. Fry, Pleading and Proving Loss Causation
in Fraud-on-the-Market-Based Securities Suits Post-Dura Pharmaceuticals, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 31
(2008).
168. Rudman, supra note 46.
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B. The Judicial Creation of Rule 23 Merits Trials
Contradicts Supreme Court Precedent
In addition, the judicial creation of Rule 23 trials for securities
fraud claims is directly contrary to applicable Supreme Court
precedent. 169 In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, the Supreme Court
held that merits issues are reserved for trial and are not to be de-
cided on a Rule 23 certification motion. 7 Even more specifically,
the Supreme Court has unequivocally stated in Basic v. Levinson
that the fraud-on-the-market presumption is rebuttable at trial.'
Thus, requiring plaintiffs to establish merits-related issues, such as
loss causation and reliance, at the Rule 23 stage is irreconcilable
with Supreme Court precedent.
1. Eisen v. Carlisle. No Merits Inquiries on Class Certification
The Court in Eisen was clear that courts do not have any author-
ity under Rule 23 to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits
of a suit in determining whether to maintain an action as a class• 172
action. In Eisen, the Supreme Court explained that a merits in-
quiry on class certification contravenes Rule 23 because it allows a
plaintiff to secure the benefit of a class action without first satisfy-
ing its requirements and that it may deny defendants traditional
rules and procedures applicable to civil trials.17 ' The Court further
reasoned that the inquiry on a Rule 23 motion is not whether the
169. See In re LDK Solar Sec. Litig., 255 F.R.D. 519, 530 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (stating that
Oscar injects a merits inquiry into the class-certification inquiry through the back door and
that it is in no small tension with the Supreme Court's Basic decision); Schleicher v. Wendt,
No. 1:02-cv-1332-DFH-TAB, 2009 WL 761157, at *26-27 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 20, 2009) (stating
that Oscar runs contrary to Supreme Court precedent). The federal circuit courts of appeal
appear to be "boiling the frog." See POSNER, supra note 140, at 277 (a term borrowed by
Judge Richard Posner to describe how Supreme Court Justices gradually extinguish prior
unloved precedents from Justice Alito's plurality opinion in Hein v. Freedom From Religion
Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007)).
170. Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
171. 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988).
172. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177 ("We find nothing in either the language or history of Rule
23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit
in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action."). In Eisen, a class
action was brought against certain brokerage firms trading on the New York Stock Exchange
alleging violations of both antitrust and securities laws. Id. at 160. The district court certified
a class of over two million persons. Id. at 166. The district court then conducted a prelimi-
nary hearing on the merits and after determining that the plaintiff was more than likely to
prevail at trial, imposed ninety-percent of the costs of serving notice on the class on the
defendant. Id. at 168. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and stated that
the district court had no authority to hold a preliminary hearing on the merits. Id. at 169.
173. Id. at 177-78.
WINTER 2010]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
plaintiff has stated a cause of action or whether he will prevail on
the merits; rather, the issue is whether the requirements of Rule 23
are met.14 Thus, both Oscar and In re Salomon contravene the clear
holding of Eisen.
2. Basic v. Levinson: The Fraud-on-the-Market
Presumption Is Rebuttable at Trial
Similarly, the trend of allowing rebuttal of the fraud-on-the-
market presumption at the class certification stage cuts against the
precedent set forth in Basic. 7 In Basic, the Supreme Court estab-
lished that the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance is a
rebuttable presumption, no doubt. 76 However, the relevant inquiry
is when is this presumption rebuttable? The Supreme Court in Basic
provides the answer: at trial. The Basic Court specifically left issues
of loss causation and the fraud-on-the-market presumption for
trial. The Supreme Court stated:
[I]f, despite petitioners' allegedly fraudulent attempt to ma-
nipulate market price, news of the merger discussions credibly
entered the market and dissipated the effects of the misstate-
ments, those who traded Basic shares after the corrective
statements would have no direct or indirect connection with
the fraud.
... We note there may be a certain incongruity between the
assumption that Basic shares are traded on a well-developed,
efficient, and information-hungry market, and the allegation
that such a market could remain misinformed, and its valua-
tion of Basic shares depressed ... on the basis of the three
public statements. Proof of that sort is a matter for trial, through-
out which the District Court retains the authority to amend
the certification order as may be appropriate. 7
This statement by the Supreme Court has been correctly inter-
preted to mean that the defendant's rebuttal burden to show that
the market price was not affected by the misrepresentation is a
174. Id. at 178 (citing Miller v. Mackey Int'l, 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971)).
175. In re LDK Solar Sec. Litig., 255 F.R.D. 519, 530 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
176. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248.
177. Id. at 248-49 & n.29 (emphasis added).
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matter for trial. 's In other words, a defense of "non-reliance" is a
matter for trial. 79 A battle of the experts is not required at the Rule
23 stage.
3. The Rebuttal Opportunity Is at Trial
An approach consistent with Supreme Court precedent requires
only that all other questions be common to the class once the
plaintiff makes a showing that the fraud-on-the-market presump-
tion attaches.1 8 0 The relevant question at the Rule 23 stage is only
whether the plaintiffs expert's methodology will apply to the en-
tire class. 8
The reason for this, as explained in Eisen, is simple: "the ques-
tion is not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of
action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the re-
quirements of Rule 23 are met., 1 2 The issue is a procedural one:
whether questions raised by the litigation would be most efficiently
addressed as a class rather than on an individual basis. 83 Thus, "to
require [a] plaintiff to show more ... would conflate the issue of
whether common issues will dominate the merits decision with the
merits decision itself."184 A defendant's arguments, even if substan-
tial, do not address the purposes of Rule 23.185
In sum, the approach Eisen and Basic demand, and that certain
district courts already abide by,186 is that once the plaintiff estab-
lishes reliance and that the fraud-on-the-market presumption
applies, the class should be certified. 1
87
178. Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1378 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Micron Techs., Inc.
Sec. Litig., 247 F.R.D. 627, 634 (D. Idaho 2007) (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 249 n.29). The
defendant must do more than just raise questions to sever the link connecting the fraud-on-
the-market theory. In re Micron Techs., 247 F.R.D. at 634.
179. Rudman, supra note 46.
180. In reCredit Suisse-AOL Sec. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 17, 29 (D. Mass. 2008).
181. Lapin v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 254 F.R.D. 168, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
182. Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974) (internal citations and quo-
tations omitted).
183. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 236 F.R.D. 208, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). In-
terestingly, the very "question of whether individual traits on the reliance issue are necessary
is itself a question that is common to the whole class." 3 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.10[5] (5th ed. 2005).
184. In re Credit Suisse-AOL Sec. Litig., 253 F.R.D. at 29 (internal quotation omitted).
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., In re Nature's Sunshine Prods. Inc., Sec. Litig., 251 F.D.R. 656, 661 (D.
Utah 2008); Lapin, 254 F.R.D. at 182; In re Ashanti Goldfields Sec. Litig., No. CV-00-
0717(DGT), 2004 WL 626810, at "13 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2004).
187. In fact, defendants may be better off embracing the Basic presumption at the class
certification stage and later turn the presumption to their advantage. Bradford Cornell & R.
Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory to Measure Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37
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While a court must still analyze whether the plaintiff has estab-
lished that he is initially entitled to the presumption,'88 the
defendant's opportunity to refute this presumption is reserved for
trial, and it is not appropriate on a class certification motion. As
the district court in In re Salomon correctly noted, "if the evidence
at trial or on summary judgment indicates that the alleged misrepre-
sentations ... did not affect the value of [the company's] shares
during the class period, Basic would not apply."189 In addition, "[a] t
trial or on summary judgment, defendants' argument regarding
the reports' effect (or lack of effect) on market price will also be
relevant to the question of loss causation."'190
C. The Judicial Creation of Class Certification Merits Trials Is
Incompatible With the Seventh Amendment
to the Constitution
The federal courts' creation of class certification merits trials
also impermissibly infringes on plaintiffs' Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial.'9 ' The Seventh Amendment provides that in
suits at common law, the right of a trial by jury shall be preserved. 19
UCLA L. REv. 883, 919 (1990). For example, defendants may successfully argue that the
market was indeed efficient, "reflect[ing] all available information in securities pricing,
including information from nonissuer sources that questions, contradicts, or corrects the
issuer's misrepresentation." Id. at 919 (citing cases where the fraud-on-the-market theory has
worked against plaintiffs).
188. The availability of the presumption is not a merits issue, thus warranting an analy-
sis as to whether the market was efficient. Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v.
Bombardier, Inc., No. 05-CV-01898, 2006 WL 2161887, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2006).
However, "whether the plaintiff may take advantage of the presumption of reliance (through either
Affiliated Ute or Basic) and whether the plaintiff has proven reliance are distinct inquiries." Id. at
*9 (emphasis in original).
189. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 236 F.R.D. 208, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see
also HAZEN, supra note 183, § 12.10[5] (stating "the proper approach is to let the litigation
continue as a class action until it becomes apparent that the common issues no longer pre-
dominate.").
190. In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 236 F.R.D. at 223 n.1 1.
191. A Seventh Amendment challenge was raised by the plaintiffs in Cammer v. Bloom,
711 F. Supp. 1264, 1289 (D.N.J. 1989). The plaintiffs claimed that evidence as to the pre-
sumption of the fraud-on-the-market theory would have to be reexamined by a second jury
and that this infringed on their rights to have a single jury decide all the factual issues of the
case. Id. The Cammer court addressed only whether the determination of a presumption
infringes on the Seventh Amendment. Id. at 1289-91 (stating that a presumption is a rule of
evidence and signifies a ruling of law). The Cammer court did not address whether an actual
determination of loss causation, as in Oscar, infringes on the Seventh Amendment.
192. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment ensures citizenship by preserv-
ing "an active role for citizens in the administration of both civil and criminal justice." CAss
R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR's UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE
The Unjustified Judicial Creation
The right to a jury trial is not absolute'93 and current Supreme
Court jurisprudence concerning "the Seventh Amendment re-
quire[s] only the preservation of the substance of the English
common law jury trial [as it existed] in 1791."'' In the English
common law, juries decided only questions of fact and not ques-
tions of law.195 Therefore, presently, questions of fact are reserved
for the jury, not the court.
1 96
Noted scholar Suja A. Thomas has written extensively on the
Seventh Amendment implications of procedural devices such as
the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment.
1 97
According to Thomas, the framework for determining the consti-
tutionality of procedural devices in light of Seventh Amendment
concerns is as follows: (1) "under the common law, only the jury or
the parties determine the facts," (2) a court determines "the suffi-
ciency of the evidence only after a jury trial," and even then, if
evidence is believed to be insufficient, the court orders a new trial,
and (3) "a jury decide [s] a case with any evidence, however im-
probable." 98 Rule 23 must fit within the confines of the Seventh
Amendment. The judicial creation of merits barriers to class certi-
fication is inconsistent with the Seventh Amendment.
NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 113 (2004). "Jury trials give a continuing place to ordinary peo-
ple in designing the content of law-especially when the stakes are very high." Id.
193. Suja A. Thomas, Essay, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV.
139, 146 (2007) [hereinafter Thomas, Summary Judgment]. Traditionally, equity matters were
not afforded ajury trial, but legal matters were. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 446 (1830);
see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oubre, 93 F.R.D. 622, 623 (M.D. La. 1982) (holding an ac-
tion to cancel mineral lease is equitable and not subject to trial by jury). Rule lOb-5 claims
are governed by the Seventh Amendment. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
551 U.S. 308, 327 (2007).
194. Suja A. Thomas, The Seventh Amendment, Modern Procedure, and the English Common
Law, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 687, 700 (2004) [hereinafter Thomas, The Seventh Amendment, Moden
Procedure] (emphasis added).
195. Thomas, Summary Judgment, supra note 193, at 148; see also Woods v. Holy Cross
Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1178 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that juries determine ultimate questions
of fact).
196. In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920) ("[U]ltimate determination of issues of
fact by the jury [should] not [be] interfered with."); Walker v. N.M. & S. Pac. R.R. Co., 165
U.S. 593, 596 (1897) (issues of fact in common-law actions are to be settled by the jury).
197. Professor Thomas makes a compelling argument for the unconstitutionality of
both. See Thomas, Motion to Dismiss, supra note 140; Thomas, Summary Judgment, supra note
193; Suja A. Thomas, The Unconstitutionality of Summary Judgment: A Status Report, 93 IOWA L.
REV. 1613 (2008); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Still Unconstitutional: A Reply to
Professors Brunet and Nelson, 93 IOWA L. REv. 1667 (2008); Suja A. Thomas, Judicial Modesty
and the Jury, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 767 (2005); Thomas, The Seventh Amendment, Modem Proce-
dure, supra note 194; Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the
Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO STATE L.J. 731 (2003).
198. Thomas, SummaryJudgment, supra note 193, at 180 ("Third, ajury would decide a
case that had any evidence, however improbable that evidence was, unless the moving party
admitted the facts and conclusions. . .).
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Under Oscar, when plaintiffs move to certify a class, they must es-
tablish loss causation by a preponderance of the evidence."' Under
In re Salomon, once plaintiffs set forth evidence to establish the
fraud-on-the-market presumption on a class certification motion,
the defendant invariably presents rebuttal evidence, 20 0 and the
court must resolve whether the plaintiffs have established loss cau-
sation on a Rule 23 motion. This resolution of the merits is
inconsistent with the Seventh Amendment. According to Thomas,
the common law only allowed ajudge to consider the sufficiency of
the evidence after a jury trial and verdict.' Even a court only con-
sidering the reasonableness of inferences drawn from the evidence
presented contravenes common law procedures, which require the
judge to accept all allegations of the party as true, regardless of the
improbability of those allegations.0 2 Resolving a battle of the ex-
perts concerning loss causation and reliance falls within the jury's
203province to listen, weigh, accept, or reject expert testimony. In-
deed,
[T]here is a significant difference between allowing ajudge to
dispose of a case by applying a determinative legal principle
to undisputed facts and allowing ajudge to decide a factual is-
sue because he or she believes the evidence allows only one
conclusion. Ajudge always decides the former. As to the latter,
if one or more facts are in dispute or different inferences may
199. Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 272 (5th Cir.
2007) (Dennis,J., dissenting) (stating that the majority holds that plaintiffs must prove loss
causation "by a preponderance of all admissible evidence").
200. In reSalomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 485 (2d Cir. 2008).
201. Thomas, Summary Judgment, supra note 193, at 161. Even then, where ajudge found
insufficient evidence, anotherjury would decide the second case, and not the original judge.
Id.
202. Id. at 159. This stricter approach would hold even the Seventh Circuit's standard
unconstitutional. See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 602 (7th Cir.
2006), vacated, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007) (advocating
a reasonableness standard).
203. Lapin v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 254 F.R.D. 168, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see Miller, su-
pra note 146, at 1104. Professor Miller notes:
[Consider] the case of expert wimesses to fact. What is their function? It is just this, of
judging facts. They are called in because they are men of skill and can interpret phe-
nomena which other men cannot, or cannot safely interpret .... It is perfectly well
settled in our law that such opinions or judgments are merely those of a witness, they
are to aid the jury or the judge of fact, and not to bind them; the final judgment is for
the jury, and, unquestionably, the judgment is one of fact.
Id. at 1104 n.622 (citingJames B. Thayer, "Law and Fact" injury TriaLs, 4 HARV. L. REv. 147,
154-55 (1890)).
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be drawn from undisputed facts, a jury should be allowed to
find for either party.
2 0 4
This is the case with loss causation 20 5 and reliance-at best, differ-
ent inferences can be drawn from undisputed facts. The Oscar
decision is a perfect case in point: the Fifth Circuit weighed compet-
ing expert theories and rejected the plaintiffs' expert's conclusion
as "untenable.
2 0 6
Even those that argue for a more limited view of the Seventh
Amendment in securities fraud litigation recognize that the Fifth
Circuit in Oscar overstepped its role at the class certification stage.
For example, Richard A. Nagareda argues that issues of aggregate
proof, such as event studies in securities fraud litigation which
demonstrate fatal dissimilarities, should be determined as a matter
of law by the judge at the class certification stage, yet he still ac-
knowledges that Oscar was incorrect as a ruling on class
certification. °7 By finding facts concerning loss causation and reli-
ance, this mini-trial on a motion for class certification intrudes on
plaintiffs' right to trial by jury. Furthermore, the Seventh Amend-
ment concerns raised by a resolution of the merits at the class
certification stage are apparent when one considers the issues of
collateral estoppel and issue preclusion. Collateral estoppel "bar[s]
a party from relitigating an issue determined against that party in
an earlier action."200 In Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., the Seventh Circuit
stated that, "[a]lthough claim preclusion (resjudicata) depends on
a final judgment, issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) does not."'20
The Seventh Circuit has held that a class certification decision is
collateral estoppel for future class certification motions filed by
members of the class.2'0 Thus, collateral estoppel works for issues
resolved by the court on class certification even if they are resolved
204. Id. at 1091-92. Abrogating the Seventh Amendment cannot be justified for securi-
ties class actions on the basis of efficiency and cost; instead the Seventh Amendment gives a
jury the power to decide cases that cannot be eliminated by Congress or the courts. Thomas,
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 140, at 1887. Perhaps this hostility toward the Seventh Amend-
ment merely represents the judiciary's hostility toward direct democracy. See POSNER, supra
note 140, at 329.
205. In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 266, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating that loss
causation relates to the merits and cannot be decided at the Rule 23 stage).
206. Oscar Private Eqtity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 270 (5th Cir.
2007).
207. Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof 84 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 97, 140 (2009).
208. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 279 (8th ed. 1999).
209. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Lifig., 333 F.3d 763, 767 (7th
Cir. 2003).
210. Id. at 768-69.
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only as part of the class certification stage.2" The judicial creation
of merits trials at the class certification stage for securities actions
compounds this problem by precluding class plaintiffs from litigat-
ing merits issues such as reliance and causation in later suits
without a trial by jury.
This end run around the right to a trial by jury is inconsistent
with Supreme Court precedent. The class action was originally a
device in equity.21 2 The Supreme Court held in Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover that a federal court could not make findings in an equi-
table proceeding (i.e., a class certification decision) that would be
collateral estoppel in a later action at law.12 The consequences of
collateral estoppel can be dire for both defendants and plaintiffs:
"[i] t can be invoked offensively.., to preclude litigation of an is-
sue that was decided favorably .. . in a prior action. Or, it can be
used defensively ... to preclude relitigation of an issue that was
decided in his favor in a prior suit. '214 If the doctrine of collateral
estoppel did not apply to the factual findings on loss causation and
reliance, the same evidence would have to be assessed again, result-
ing in a duplication of efforts. Thus, the Rule 23 analysis removes
facts from the jury's purview, violating the plaintiff's Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial.
A recent decision from the Fifth Circuit in Alaska Electrical Pen-
sion Fund v. Flowserve Corp. recognizes the Seventh Amendment
concerns expressed by this Article and tries to address that issue. 215
However, its reasoning only underscores the problem. The
Flowserve court reaffirmed that the plaintiffs "bore the burden of
211. Id. at 768. This Rule 23 analysis is comparable to a Rule 12(b) (6) analysis advanced
under Tellabs where courts must weigh competing inferences and select among them.
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323 (2007). The Supreme Court
has recognized that procedural dismissals based on Rule 12(b)(6) constitute judgments on
the merits for purposes of collateral estoppel. A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 925 (2d ed. 2007) (citing Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie,
452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981)). Thus, just as a determination on a 12(b)(6) motion consti-
tutes ajudgment on the merits, so too does the courts' determination on a Rule 23 analysis.
The proceeding need not be a full adjudicatory proceeding for the doctrine of collateral
estoppel to apply. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS
1292 (10th ed. 2009).
212. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940) ("The class suit was an invention of equity
to enable it to proceed to a decree in suits where the number of those interested in the
subject of the litigation is so great that their joinder as parties in conformity to the usual
rules of procedure is impracticable.").
213. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959).
214. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 211, at 1273. Also, findings of loss causation and reliance
at the class certification stage may constitute the law of the case, and bind the parties to
those determinations. SPENCER, supra note 211, at 948 (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus.
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 815-16 (1988)).
215. 572 F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Former Justice O'Connor sat on the
panel by designation.
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establishing loss causation by a preponderance of the evidence in
order to obtain certification of its proposed class."216 Yet, as this
Article shows and as the Flowserve court's own reliance on cases
like Eisen and Oscar demonstrates, that reaffirmation is based on
an erroneous view of the requirements of Rule 23 at the class cer-
tification stage. The court accuses the plaintiffs of conflating
issues of loss causation at the class certification stage with that is-
217sue on the merits, but it is the court that erroneously conflates
those issues. As this Article shows, Supreme Court precedent gov-
erning Rule 23 and the federal securities laws do not justify
requiring plaintiffs to prove any merits issue, such as loss causa-
tion, by a preponderance of the evidence at the class certification
stage. The Flowserve court repeats this fundamental error.
As a consequence, the court was then compelled to address the
Seventh Amendment concern raised by improperly conflating
class certification issues with the merits. It purports to relieve the
Seventh Amendment concern by announcing that any overlap is
"only coincidental, 218 and that any judicial "findings in connec-
tion with a holding on class certification do not resolve
loss-causation issues on the merits, even when-as here-the two
issues are practically identical.",2 ' As a general matter, the court's
conclusion that class certification findings made by a judge can-
not preclude plaintiffs from presenting those same issues to ajury
for a finding on the merits seems to avoid the Seventh Amend-
ment problem. Yet the court's reasoning actually reinforces the
Seventh Amendment concerns raised in this Article.
First, the court recognized that there would be a Seventh
Amendment problem if a judge's class certification findings pre-
cluded plaintiffs from re-litigating those same issues to a jury on
the merits. °20 Second, the only legal support for the court's con-
clusion that no such issue preclusion can take place is its note
that class certification findings can be "revised" and are not fi-
nal.22' This turns the Basic presumption on its head: in Basic, the
Supreme Court afforded the plaintiffs a presumption of reliance
at the class certification stage and left it to the defendants to re-
but at trial 2  Moreover, as previously shown, the idea that
certification proceedings can later be "revised" has been
216. Id. at 229.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 233.
220. Id. at 228-29.
221. Id.
222. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249 n.29 (1988).
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undermined by the Seventh Circuit's In re Bridgestone/Firestone de-
cision, in which the court held that non-final judicial findings are
in fact given preclusive collateral estoppel effect in certain cir-
cumstances. 223 A judicial finding of no loss causation at the class
certification stage, therefore, could very well preclude a plaintiff
who is a member of a class from trial by jury on the merits of that
issue. Third, as this Article points out, as a practical matter the
decision to deny class certification precludes individual plaintiffs
from continuing to prosecute their individual claims to a jury.
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit's recent Flowserve case exemplifies
the constitutional and policy problems created by the continua-
tion of the trend of federal courts improperly requiring plaintiffs
to establish the merits of their securities fraud claims at the class
certification stage. The most effective way to prevent those prob-
lems is to recognize that Rule 23 does not require plaintiffs to
establish any essential elements of their securities fraud claims at
the class certification stage.
V. RULE 23 TRIALS ARE UNSUPPORTED BY POLICY
Despite this trend's discord with the federal securities laws, Su-
preme Court precedent, and the Seventh Amendment, resolving
merit disputes at the class certification stage lacks the justification
of addressing any legitimate policy concern. As evidenced by the
Supreme Court's recent Stoneridge decision, having a policy justifi-
cation is exceedingly important in securities case law.24 In
particular, as this Part demonstrates, the harm purportedly
averted by the trend is illusory, whereas the harm caused is sig-
nificant.
223. 333 F.3d 763, 767 (7th Cir. 2003).
224. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 128 S. Ct. 761, 772 (2008); see
also KAUFMAN, SECURITIES LITIGATION, supra note 94, § 15:7:05.
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A. The Harm Averted by the Introduction of Rule 23
Merits Trials Is Illusory
The Rule 23 merits trial trend purports to address the same225 226 may hr 227 ta eui
concern of legislators, judges, and many others that securi
ties fraud class actions are frivolous, inefficient, and abusive.
These concerns are illusory. Stricter standards for securities class
actions are justified because too often defendants are forced in
terrorem into settlement.2 2 8 In particular, the rigorous certification
225. Through the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Congress
sought to combat perceived frivolous strike suits and combat abuse. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4
(1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683; see also S. REP. No. 104-98, at 5 (1995), as
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 684 (noting the system is being abused and misused);
H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730
(abusive practices include "(1) the routine filing of lawsuits against issuers ... whenever
there is a significant change in an issuer's stock price, without regard to any underlying
culpability .... (2) the targeting [of] deep pocket defendants ... and individuals who may
be covered by insurance," (3) imposing burdensome discovery costs to push a settlement,
and (4) class action manipulation).
226. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, 128 S. Ct. at 772 (stating securities fraud actions
chill foreign investment); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 312
(2007) (stating that securities fraud actions impose substantial costs on companies when
employed abusively); Higginbotham v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007)
(distrusting plaintiffs attorneys by implying they fabricate witnesses).
227. See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITI-
GATION: THE PROBLEM, ITS IMPACT, AND THE PATH TO REFORM (2008); Recent Case,
Securities Litigation--Class Certification-Fifth Circuit Holds that Plaintiffs Must Prove Loss Causa-
tion Before Being Certified as a Class, 121 HARV. L. REv. 890, 896-97 (2008) (stating securities
class actions fail to compensate victims and fail to deter undesirable corporate behavior).
The U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform proposes reform of the securities fraud class
action by enacting an attorney accountability act to enhance transparency in the selection of
lead counsel, by requiring detailed documents of clients' alleged losses, by shifting the cost
of discovery onto plaintiffs in certain instances, and by refining the measure of damages in
class actions. However, these deregulation hawks fail to consider that deregulation may in
fact be the problem which causes securities fraud litigation. Charles W. Murdock, Sarbanes-
Oxley Five Years Later: Hero or Villain, 39 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 525, 562 (2008). Professor Murdock
notes that "Enron certainly exploited, or rather over-exploited, deregulation." Id. Moreover,
actions by the Securities Exchange Commission are supplemental to private-plaintiff actions.
"SEC settlements do not parallel shareholder class actions." JAN LARSEN ET AL., NERA ECON.
CONSULTING, SEC SETTLEMENTS: A NEW ERA PosT-SOX 7 (2008) (on file with the Univer-
sity of MichiganJournal of Law Reform) (emphasis added).
228. Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 267 (5th Cir.
2007); see also Black, supra note 95, at 338-39 (surveying the classic debate between propo-
nents and opponents of the wisdom of the private right of action under Rule 10b-5). One
commentator suggested that the Supreme Court's recent trend of restrictive pleading is due
to the fact that the justices are not seeing real injured plaintiffs. Marcia Coyle, Prevailing
Winds: In the First Full Term with Alito, Court Took Marked Conservative Turn, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 1,
2007 ("'We're seeing a lot of cases where the justices don't see real injured people bringing
real claims. They see lawyers trying to extort.' ... The court acted similarly in the securities
area in [Tellabs] by raising the bar on pleading a claim under the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act." (quoting Mark Levy of Kilpatrick Stockton LLP)). Commentators that
support the Oscardecision for restricting securities class actions generally do so because they
perceive these class actions as exerting inexorable pressure on defendants to settle. Laurie
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requirement is primarily justified because of the in terrorem threat
class certification presents.
2 29
Yet the prevention of in terrorem class action settlements is too
weak in theory and in fact to support the Rule 23 trend. First, the
in terrorem concept is illogical. Second, concerns about expensive
class discovery do not warrant a heightened class certification stan-
dard. Third, mechanisms already in place-endorsed by Congress
and the Supreme Court-mitigate the threat of frivolous securities
class actions. Courts should utilize these devices more effectively
rather than craft new, unendorsed, and unconstitutional devices.
1. The In Terrorem Concept Is Illogical
The in terrorem concept suffers from logical deficiencies. As an
initial matter, to complain that defendants are forced into settle-
ment ignores the well-settled judicial pillar that the law favors
settlement of merited claims.23 ' Further, whether a claim is "frivo-
lous" is often no more than an untestable rhetorical assertion
insufficient to deny investors a remedy for harmful conduct.231
Nevertheless, even if there is verifiable evidence that plaintiffs
bring frivolous securities class actions, a heightened barrier to class
certification is not necessarily consistent with pragmatic business
practices.
a. The Law Favors Settlement
Those that presume the frivolity of securities class actions gener-
ally argue that these actions force defendants in terrorem into
settlement.22 Absent the in terrorem settlement concern, however,
B. Smilan, A Basic Truth: Courts Increasingly Require the Rebuttable Fraud-on-the-Market Presump-
tion of Reliance Be Fully Established Before Certification of Securities Class Actions, in PRACTISING
LAW INSTITUTE, SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2008 413, 416
(Thomson West 2008).
229. See Oscar, 487 F.3d at 267; Recent Case, Securities Litigation-Class Certification-Fifh
Circuit Holds that Plaintiffs Must Prove Loss Causation Before Being Certified as a Class, 121 HARV.
L. REv. 890, 890 (2008) (stating that courts have erected additional barriers to class certifi-
cation in securities actions to guard defendants from settling frivolous claims). Despite the
fact that this policy concern is insufficient tojustify a rigorous standard, there is a competing
policy concern that mandates against a rigorous standard: a rigorous standard can make it
harder for victims to pursue smaller claims absent a class action device. Evans, supra note 3,
at 1.
230. See infra Part V.A.I.a.
231. John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1534, 1536 n.5 (2006).
232. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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there is no justification for a rigorous Rule 23 standard. To main-
tain that in terrorem settlements justify a rigorous class certification
analysis requires that the plaintiff bring a frivolous claim. If the ac-
tion is not frivolous, the defendants' entering into a settlement is
in fact a good thing.2 s Settlement compensates the injured party,
spares both parties litigation costs, and promotes judicial econ-231
omy. Class action suits readily lend themselves to compromise
because of the difficulties of proof, the uncertainties of the out-
come, and the typical length of the litigation. "There is an
overriding public interest in settling and quieting litigation, and
this is particularly true in class actions."23 6 Moreover, according to
NERA Economic Consulting, plaintiffs are suffering higher losses,
but there has been no corollary rise in the median settlement
value. 37 One may infer that settlement may be "cheaper" compen-
sation for injured plaintiffs. The main problem with the in terrorem
policy concern is that it is inapplicable where a claim has merit. 238
233. Instances of legitimate corporate fraud-as opposed to plaintiff fear mongering-
are not unheard of. For example, Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve,
noted that modern corporate accounting practices responsible for the Enron and World-
com debacles provided corporate management with broad discretion "to favorably bias their
results to the edge of outright fraud. Some clearly went over the line." ALAN GREENSPAN,
THE AGE OF TURBULENCE 429 (Penguin Books 2008); see also BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER
ELKIND, THE SMARTEST Guys IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF
ENRON (Penguin Group 2003) (chronicling the massive Enron accounting scandal).
234. Courts recognize that there is a strong judicial policy in favor of settlement, par-
ticularly in the class action context. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods.
Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Pacific Enters. Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 378
(9th Cir. 1995); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 1982); Piambino v. Bailey,
610 F.2d 1306, 1328 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Blech Sec. Litig., No. 94 CIV. 7696, 2000 WL
661680, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2000); Adair v. Bristol Tech. Sys., Inc., No. 97 CIV. 5874,
1999 WL 1037878, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1999); In re Gulf Oil/Cities Serv. Tender Offer
Litig., 142 F.R.D. 588, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
235. Evans, supra note 3, at 3-6; see also Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156, 186
n.8 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); In re Hydrogen Peroxide
Antitrust Litig., No. 07-1689, 2008 WL 5411562, at *3 n.6 (3d Cir. Dec. 30, 2008). Magistrate
Judge Morton Denlow for the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois has gone so far as to suggest that both plaintiffs and defendants should include in their
initial pleadings requests for a mediated settlement conference to facilitate settlement. Mor-
ton Denlow, Making Full Use of the Court: Cone to Settle First, Litigate Second, 35 LITIG. 28, 29
(2008).
236. In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Litig., 163 F.R.D. 200, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
237. Plancich & Starykh, supra note 149, at 14 fig.15 (demonstrating that in 1996 the ra-
tio between median investor losses and median settlement was 7.1%, but in 2008 the ratio is
only 2.7%).
238. Should defendants and others still be heard to complain of litigation costs where
the claim has merit, a very simple, yet often overlooked, response exists: "'Why Not Tell the
Truth?' Justice Brandeis observed that sunlight is a great disinfectant. If we focus on telling
the truth, rather than obfuscating financial results, we can have the best of all worlds: an
efficient market and minimal litigation." Murdock, supra note 227, at 568-69. Moreover,
"[i]n a typical litigation scenario, the courts merely serve as a background for the bargaining
between parties to reach a settlement. Thus, to single out settlements in securities litigation
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Perversely, under Oscar, Flowserve, and Salomon, injured investors
asserting meritorious claims must now face a more rigorous class
certification analysis without any reason for doing so. Even worse,
absent class action status, injured investors may never bring the
merited claim, deciding it is just not worth the effort despite the
suffered wrong.
b. Concerns About "Frivolous" Claims are
Unfounded and Untested.
Second, concerns in general about frivolous claims are un-
founded and largely unverifiable. Proponents of securities class
action reform claim that securities class actions cost millions of dol-
lars in unnecessary legal expenses, and are often settled without
regard to the merits solely to avoid the expense and risks of de-
fending "frivolous" suits. 2 39 "Such claims, however, are based more
on rhetoric than on empirical proof."24° As John C. Coffee, Jr., se-
curities law expert, states:
The true "strike suit" nuisance action, filed only because it was
too expensive to defend, is, in this author's judgment, a beast
like the unicorn, more discussed than directly observed. Al-
though small settlements may have been impelled in part by
the high cost of defense, the corresponding observation is
that the small damages in these cases also did not justify much
effort on the plaintiff's side. Neither side wanted to invest
much effort in them-but this does not make them inherently
frivolous. Similarly, the economic evidence that strike suits
predominate also seems unpersuasive.41
Even despite the logistical problem that there is little substantial
means by which to respond to the mantra that "most class actions
have little merit,"2 42 defendants also require plaintiffs to enter into
strict confidentiality agreements before engaging in document
243production. Additionally, defendants require plaintiffs to return
as nuisance-driven ignores the fact that most litigation is aimed at achieving settlement."
Wunderlich, supra note 140, at 658.
239. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
240. D. Brian Hufford, Deterring Fraud vs. Avoiding the "Strike Suit": Reaching an Appropri-
ate Balance, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 593, 633 (1995).
241. Coffee, supra note 231, at 1536 n.5.
242. Hufford, supra note 240, at 637.
243. Id.
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or destroy all such documents upon the conclusion of a case.
Thus, plaintiffs' attorneys are generally unable to respond to vague
public attacks on the validity of their suits by pointing to specific
evidence of uncovered fraud .
c. Even if the Claim Is Frivolous, Pragmatic Business Practice
Does Not Require Settlement of Frivolous Claims
Even if a plaintiff brings a claim that is frivolous or meritless, it is
tenuous to contend that in terrorem settlements mandate a stricter
class certification analysis. For the fear of in terrorem settlements to
be legitimate, not only must a claim be meritless, but the costs of
litigating must outweigh those of settling.246 There is little evidence
that defendants invariably settle meritless claims to avoid the costs
of litigation. Indeed, in deciding whether to litigate frivolous
claims, a rational defendant may consider not only the costs of
litigation and the probability of success, but also the potential
long-range benefits it may derive from signaling its reputation for
an unwillingness to settle these claims.24' Thus, in the long-run,
litigating such a claim may turn out to be more cost-effective and
a more pragmatic business solution for the defendant. In some
cases, it would be shortsighted for a corporation to avoid imme-




246. See Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1465,
1469 (2004).
247. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 569-70 (6th ed. 2003) (discuss-
ing assorted variables that enter into settlement decisions, including probability of winning,
precedential value from winning, and degrees of risk preference of the parties). Should a
plaintiff bring a frivolous claim against a corporate defendant, it may even be in the best
interest of the corporate defendant not to settle, but to litigate the case to the fullest extent
possible. Cf Coffee, supra note 241, at 1585 (concluding that litigation is often feigned, that
adversaries skirmish over pretrial motions, but ultimately agree to settle to impose costs on
the absent shareholders). Coffee also concludes that once securities litigation becomes
more adversarial, then the SEC will be able to address the compensatory problem settle-
ments pose. Id. at 1585-86.
248. Cf RICHARD A. POSNER, LAw, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 60-61 (2003)
("Pragmatic adjudication is not.., a synonym for ad hoc decisionmaking, that is, for always
deciding a case in the way that will have the best immediate consequences without regard to
possible future consequences .... 'Shortsighted' is not part of the definition of 'prag-
matic."'); see also POSNER, supra note 140, at 239 (distinguishing sensible pragmatic
adjudication from shortsighted pragmatists).
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For example, consider the following scenario illustrated by Sena-
tor Robert Bennett in response to the President's veto of the
PSLRA:
There is a lawyer in New York who watches [the Company],
and whenever the compensation of the directors goes up for
whatever reason, he automatically files a lawsuit .... [Legal
counsel told the director:] "[T]his lawyer knows he will never
win his suit. He knows we will never spend the money to take
him to court. It would cost us about $500,000 to prosecute
this suit and take him to court and win and it is cheaper for us
to send him a $100,000 check to settle this.... [Director], you
can be as outraged as you want to be, but our alternative is to
prosecute this lawsuit, take him to court, beat him in court,
see a $500,000 legal bill run up in the process." . .. [Later,
this] lawyer decided to expand his practice and he started su-
ing other companies .... One of the companies.., looked at
this and decided the time has come to put an end to it and...
we can take this man to court and ruin him in his legal costs,
trying to defend himself. So the system that had worked for
the lawyer in one circumstance then turned against him....
[T]hey ultimately did put a stop to it because when he was
faced with actually proving his position in a court of law and
running up the costs connected with that kind of litigation,
the lawyer was finally forced to back down." 9
What is missing from this story is how many times the Director's
corporation made these payments to this New York lawyer. The an-
swer is quite important: if the corporation made these payments
more than five times, then it would have been more economically
efficient to fight the case initially, putting him out of business and
preventing future costs.
2. Concerns About Class Discovery Do Not Warrant a
Heightened Standard for Securities
Class Actions
Second, concerns about expensive class discovery do not warrant
a heightened securities class certification standard. In general, dis-
covery abuse is not as rampant as it is perceived to be. Moreover,
discovery is a two-way street: both plaintiffs and defendants impose
249. 141 CONG. REc. S19036 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (Statement of Sen. Bennett).
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costs and use discovery as a pressure tool. Finally, discovery serves a
vital function in the legal system.
a. Concerns About Abusive Discovery are Based on Misperceptions.
There is widespread sentiment that discovery is abusive and high
discovery costs force defendants to settle.2 0 Nowhere is this misper-
ception as visible as in securities class action litigation. Consider
the colorful comparison of an article appearing in The National
Law Journal: "Like ticks on a hound, the lawyering and lobbying
classes are sucking billions from the economy that might otherwise
be used for productive investment. And the public is getting plenty
sore about it."
2 51
While vivid anecdotes abound,2 s2 empirical research about dis-
covery in civil litigation has yielded results that differ from this• 253
conventional wisdom. The concern about abusive discovery
practices rests on prevailing sentiments that discovery is excessive
and abusive rather than on actual data. 54 Most studies measuring
the incidence of discovery survey only opinions, impressions, or
250. See Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery
Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1393 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray] (documenting, "Faludi-style," the myth of pervasive
discovery abuse); Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil Dis-
covery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785, 787 (1998) (stating that the debate over discovery reform was
based on salient personal experiences, and not with the benefit of empirical evidence).
However, there is still no working definition of what constitutes "appropriate" discovery.
Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REv.
683, 688 (1998) [hereinafter Mullenix, The Discovery Abuse Sequel].
251. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray, supra note 250, at 1398 (citingJonathan Racuh, The
Parasite Economy, 24 NAT'LJ. 980, 980 (1992)).
252. Yablon, supra note 145, at 1618-20 (discussing the "smelly paper" discovery trick).
253. Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under
the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REv. 525, 527 (1998). The discovery reform
agenda is based on "questionable social science, cosmic anecdote, and pervasive, media-
perpetrated myths." Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray, supra note 250, at 1396 (internal quota-
tions omitted). Discovery data has in fact remained constant over time. Mullenix, The
Discovery Abuse Sequel, supra note 250, at 683.
254. Wunderlich, supra note 140, at 655. "[P]erceptions based on potentially unrepre-
sentative experiences coalesced in a widely shared belief that discovery abuse was a pervasive
and serious phenomena." McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 250, at 787. "[P]roposals for
discovery reform [are] ... typically impelled by anecdotal evidence and rhetorical, but
highly compelling, reports of discovery abuse." Mullenix, The Discovery Abuse Sequel, supra
note 250, at 684. Similarly, Professor Charles Yablon argues that discovery is misperceived as
zealous advocacy. Yablon, supra note 145, at 1620. According to Yablon, this is due to the
inherent tension between the cooperative nature of discovery and the adversarial nature of
the litigation system. Id. at 1625. To remedy this over-zealous discovery advocacy, Professor
Yablon suggests that courts treat lawyers much like a parent treats their kids on long car trips
when they act up: tell them to "shut up and knock it off." Id. at 1619. This approach would
have the effect of deterring abusive discovery by making it "less fun." Id. at 1640.
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billable hours.2 5' The Columbia Field Project study, the first major
study into the actual effects of discovery practice, found that there
was no widespread failing in the scope or availability of discovery.' 6
Likewise, a 1978 study by the Federal Judicial Center found that in
fifty-three percent of cases no discovery was requested at all, and
fewer than five percent of these cases had more than ten discovery
requests.2 57 The Federal Judicial Center study found that in seventy-
two percent of the cases there were no more than two discovery
258requests. Similarly, a study by the National Center for State
Courts found that only forty-two percent of the cases in the sample
group conducted discovery.2 9 Empirical data suggests that a major-
ity of ordinary cases involve no discovery and that the majority of
the cases that do conduct discovery generally involve only two dis-
covery requests. 6 ° Thus, abusive discovery is not widespread, rather
what is widespread is the misperception that discovery is excessive
and abused.261
Admittedly, as a group, securities class action litigation suffers
from higher discovery than the ordinary civil action.2  However,
securities class actions alone do not suffer from this higher inci-
dence of discovery.62  For example, copyright, patent, and
trademark cases have higher discovery costs in general.264 In addi-
tion, trade regulation claims, tort claims, admiralty claims, contract
cases, and antitrust cases all suffer from a higher volume of discov-
255. Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)-Much
Ado About Nothing?, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 679, 681 (1995) (referencing "[t]he widespread public
and professional perception of a 'litigation explosion"' (citing WALTER K. OLSON, THE
LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT
(1991))). One such study found that, in terms of time, discovery is what lawyers statistically
spend most of their time on in the course of ordinary litigation. David M. Trubek et al., The
Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72, 91 (1983) (surveying a random sample of
cases and finding lawyers spend about 16.7% of their time on discovery matters).
256. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 250, at 786-87 (citing the Columbia Project field
survey).
257. Peggy E. Bruggman, Reducing the Costs of Civil Litigation: Discovery Reform, 2004 PuB.
LAw RESEARCH INST. 12 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform),
available at http://w3.uchastings.edu/plri/fa195tex/discov.htm. The Federal Judicial Center
study examined 3,000 cases in six United States district courts. Id.
258. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 250, at 790.
259. Bruggman, supra note 257, at 13.
260. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 250, at 790.
261. Wunderlich, supra note 140, at 655.
262. Willging, supra note 253, at 578.
263. Kevin LaCroix, Private Securities Litigation: Important Deterrent or Wasteful Churn ?, D &
0 DIARY, Oct. 26, 2008, http://www.dandodiary.com/2008/10/articles/securities-
litigation/private-securities-litigation-important-deterrent-or-wasteful-churn/ (on file with
the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
264. Willging, supra note 253, at 552.
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265
ery. In all larger and more complex cases, discovery is used more
intensely, consuming a dominating percentage of litigation re-266
sources. Thus, more extensive and intensive discovery is
explained by the fact that in larger cases, the stakes are higher, and
this is not necessarily indicative of abuse.67 There is more personal
investment in the case. Hence, there tends to be more involvement
in the discovery process, i.e., privileges are invoked more fre-
quently and clients play a more active role in discovery matters.6
In other words, higher incidences of discovery problems in larger
261class actions do not mean that more problems are likely to occur.
Rather, a high incidence of discovery problems for larger cases may
just indicate that there is plainly more discovery in those cases.27 0
And, notably, a high incidence of discovery abuse in all complex
cases does not justify a heightened class certification standard for
securities cases on their own.
b. Even if Discovery Costs are High in Securities Actions,
This Does Not Lead A Fortiori to a Higher
Class Certification Barrier
Even if data emerges that demonstrates that securities actions
abound with high discovery costs more so than any other complex
litigation, high discovery costs are to be expected in securities class
actions that claim millions of dollars in investor losses. Discovery
costs are proportional to parties' needs and the stakes in the
case.2 7 ' One study found that the size of the amount at stake in the
265. Wunderlich, supra note 140, at 656.
266. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 250, at 801. Larger and more complex cases also
are more influenced by tactical decisions. Id. However, massive amounts of discovery pre-
sents a clich~d "chicken-or-the-egg" type problem: "[b] road discovery ... can contribute to
megalitigation in part by unearthing evidence that supports claims by many." Richard L.
Marcus, Reassessing the Magnetic Pull of Megacases on Procedure, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 470
(2001). Thus, whether a big case generates big discovery or whether big discovery generates
a big case is an issue.
267. See TODD FOSTER ET AL., NERA EcON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SHARE-
HOLDER CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: FILINGS STAY LOW AND AVERAGE SETTLEMENTS STAY
HIGH-BUT ARE THESE TRENDS REVERSING? 8 (2007) (on file with the University of Michi-
gan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.nera.com/
image/PUB_- RecentTrends_- Sep2007-FINAL_4color.pdf (listing top ten shareholder class
actions in securities as all exceeding $1 billion in 2007).
268. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 250, at 801.
269. Marcus, supra note 266, at 470.
270. Id. at 471 n.60.
271. Willging, supra note 253, at 531. Indeed, the likelihood of discovery problems in-
creased as the stakes, factual complexity, and contentiousness increased. Mullenix, The
Discovery Abuse Sequel, supra note 250, at 685-86.
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case had the strongest relationship to the total litigation costs more
so than any other studied characteristic. 72 Litigation in general is
an interactive investment process that is influenced by actual and
anticipated expenditures of both the litigant and the opponent.273
The high costs of securities litigation are not due to frivolous litiga-
tion or abusive discovery, but rather this symbiotic relationship.
Further, high discovery costs do not justify a heightened class
certification barrier for the plaintiff Courts have imposed barriers
on plaintiffs because of discovery concerns, but "[d] efendants' at-
torneys (58%) were more likely than plaintiffs' attorneys (42%) to
report that they had no problems [with disclosure or discovery in
their case] ."74 Consequently, plaintiffs have more problems with
discovery than defendants. Discovery abuse is not a plaintiff-
specific phenomenon. Just as plaintiffs may use discovery as a club
to impose costs on defendants, defendants may use "dump-truck"
discovery responses as a method of overwhelming the plaintiffs.
2 75
As one commentator explained:
While companies claim that frivolous litigations result in un-
necessary defense costs, what they fail to acknowledge is that
frivolous defenses to valid claims have perhaps an even
greater impact on the costs and delays inherent in litigation.
Defense firms universally choose to file substantial motions to
dismiss or for summary judgment, even for cases which clearly
satisfy the pleading standards with valid underlying claims.
Defense attorneys also oppose class certification even in the
most routine situations and usually attempt to delay or stymie
legitimate discovery efforts. As a result, cases involving even
272. Willging, supra note 253, at 532. Other factors studied included the percentage of
litigation costs attributable to document production, the number of hours spent in deposi-
tions, the size of the law firm, the complexity and contentiousness of the case, and the type
of the case. Id. High stakes also influenced the length of the litigation: the higher the stakes,
the longer the case lasted. Id. at 533. In addition, securities litigation often involves the use
of expert witnesses, requiring expert disclosure and discovery. Discovery relating to experts
is the second most costly type of discovery. Id. at 540. In addition, securities class action
litigation is dominated by large firms. Costs for firms of more than eleven attorneys are "sig-
nificantly" higher than costs from smaller firms, and this correlation is independent of
complexity, contentiousness, or the amount at stake in the litigation. Id. at 541. Moreover,
clients that employ large firms generally have their own internal staff of lawyers, one of
whose jobs is to keep down litigation costs. Yablon, supra note 145, at 1624 n.16.
273. Trubek, supra note 255, at 76, 77 (discussing the idea that litigation is an "invest-
ment of scarce resources to achieve a future result"); see also Patrick E. Higginbotham, Judge
Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. Memorial Lecture, Loyola University School of Law: So Why Do We Call Them
Trial Courts?, 55 S.M.U. L. REV. 1405, 1412 (2002) (saying that all decisions on whether to go
to trial are based on cost concerns).
274. Willging, supra note 253, at 553.
275. Marcus, supra note 266, at 470.
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the most obvious fraud take years to litigate and often result
in settlements below what investors should, in all fairness, re-
ceive. In response to the argument that plaintiffs' firms file
frivolous suits in order to "extort" settlements, it can just as
easily be asserted that defendants delay litigation and file
frivolous defenses in order to force plaintiffs to accept low set-
tlements. 76
In addition to the fact that discovery abuse is likely to occur on
both sides of the fence, there is some indication that a lengthened
discovery process will actually benefit defendants. For example, stud-
ies find that "discovery is not cost-effective for all parties .... [F] or
plaintiffs, increased lawyer time spent on discovery was associated
with decreased measures of success .... [D]iscovery is less profitable
for plaintiffs. The more days plaintiffs spent in discovery, the lower
their recovery relative to expectations.,
277
Similarly, discovery studies found that "cases with more discovery
were actually less likely to settle. 278 The number of days spent in
discovery was associated with increases in the number of disagree-
ments between sides concerning factual and legal issues and with
lower proportions of cases settling before trial. Cases where neither
side engaged in discovery settled out of court in ninety-seven per-
cent of cases. 9 Cases where both parties engaged in discovery
settled in seventy-six percent of cases. 280 Thus, it is paradoxical to
claim that high discovery costs force defendants to settle when
higher incidences of discovery meant the parties were actually less
likely to settle.
c. Discovery Promotes Merits Resolution
Finally, discovery plays an important role in resolving litigation
on the merits. There is no dispute that defendants incur substan-
tial costs defending against securities class actions. But the issue is
not whether these defendants would have saved money by avoiding
276. Hufford, supra note 240, at 639; see also Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray, supra note
250, at 1401-02 ("[Clorporate defendants either withhold necessary evidence or inundate
requesting plaintiffs with thousands of documents (in either instance, imposing extra cost,
harassment, and delay on requesting plaintiffs). When discovery abuse occurs, it seems
equally likely to be an attempt by a corporate defendant to bankrupt a plaintiff and to in-
duce abandonment of the lawsuit as a plaintiff's attempt to harass a defendant.").
277. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 250, at 795-96.
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litigation expenses; obviously they could have.28' "The real question
is whether the benefits of a system that can adequately deter fraud
outweigh the benefits of a system that discourages both frivolous
and meritorious fraud suits. ' '282 "Discovery is designed to promote
resolution of cases on the merits. Neither defendants nor plaintiffs
could adequately assess the strength of their own claim or their
opponent's claim absent discovery requests." 213 And neither can the
court adequately assess the strength of the claims absent discovery.
Full access to evidence through open discovery ends trial by am-
bush and promotes settlement. 28 4 Discovery is designed to facilitate
a resolution on the merits.
B. The Harm Inflicted By the Rule 23 Merits
Trial Trend Is Significant
Requiring plaintiffs to prove loss causation and reliance at class
certification impedes meritorious actions unnecessarily.285 Not only
do class actions serve the convenience of the parties and promote
efficient judicial administration, 6 private actions promote our
market's integrity by supplementing otherwise deficient Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") enforcement. Private securi-
ties class actions also compensate harmed investors. Further,
281. Hufford, supra note 240, at 636. Ultimately, whether discovery is "abusive" or
"wasteful" may just be a matter of perspective. "[F]rom the judge's perspective the lawyers
have wasted a lot of time and energy on useless papers and have gotten yelled at in the
process. But from the plaintiff's counsel's perspective, plaintiffs deposition got postponed
for at least two months while the lawyers drafted and served new interrogatories and an-
swers, and that obviously felt like a victory, even if it had little impact on the ultimate
outcome of the case." Yablon, supra note 145, at 1622.
282. Hufford, supra note 240, at 636 (emphasis omitted). Indeed, In re Stratosphere Corp.
Sec. Litig., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (D. Nev. 1998), provides a good illustration of the difference
discovery can make: before discovery, the plaintiffs' initial complaint was dismissed, but after
the benefit of discovery in a bankruptcy proceeding, the court granted leave to amend the
complaint.
283. Wunderlich, supra note 150, at 658.
284. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 250, at 785-86 (quoting Maurice Rosenberg, Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2197, 2198
(1989) ("Full access to the evidence would end trial by ambush and surprise. Open discovery
would promote settlements; with both sides obliged to turn over all their important cards,
secrets would disappear and realistic negotiations would occur.")).
285. See Rudman, supra note 46, at 8 ("The disadvantage that Oscar's holding causes to
investors is evidenced by the decisions of the district courts in the Fifth Circuit that have
followed Oscar's approach in requiring proof of loss causation at class certification. These
district court decisions have led to premature dismissal of potentially meritorious claims,
thereby leaving injured plaintiffs without possibility of recovery.").
286. Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156, 185 (1974) (Douglas,J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
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heightening Rule 23 requirements for securities class actions may
actually raise litigation costs for both plaintiffs and defendants.
1. Private Actions Supplement Otherwise Deficient SEC Actions
First, private causes of action are a critical means of support for
the SEC's enforcement power.8 7 Private and public enforcement
complement one another: both securities plaintiffs' attorneys and
the SEC seek to recover damages on behalf of investors for viola-
tions of the securities laws.88 Private enforcement hence works in
conjunction with SEC enforcement. Private securities class actions
have been justified as a necessary supplement to SEC enforcement
because it has become clear that the SEC cannot monitor the mar-
kets alone. s0
287. See, e.g., In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1350 (N.D. Cal. 1994);
Hufford, supra note 240, at 594. The risk of restricting shareholders' ability to combat fraud
through private litigation becomes especially critical in light of the heavy burden already
placed on regulators who cannot replace the efforts of private attorneys general. Hufford,
supra note 240, at 638. Professor Amanda Rose insightfully proposes a new form of securities
class action reform: SEC oversight of private actions. Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities
Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule lOb-
5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (2008). While Professor Rose has undoubtedly articulated a new
approach to reforming securities class actions-likely the most sound proposal of those
currently out there-it is still unclear why securities class actions alone are in need of this
reform.
Professor Rose justifies her oversight approach because securities class actions present
problems of deterrence, compensation and market costs. Rose, supra note 286, at 1325-30.
Nevertheless, these very same problems are present in medical malpractice cases, for exam-
ple. There is an ongoing debate about how to adequately compensate a plaintiff for a
broken arm or leg. See, e.g., John V. Jacobi, Patients At a Loss: Protecting Health Care Consumers
Through Data Driven Quality Assurance, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 705, 743-47 (1997). Similarly,
medical malpractice actions are viewed as a poor deterrent, with many claiming that these
negligence actions are not the result of any negligence, but rather routine medical treat-
ment. See, e.g., Chandler Gregg, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: A Problem with No Answer?, 70
Mo. L. REv. 307, 318 (2005). In addition, the medical malpractice cause of action is in turn
claimed to be responsible for rising medical costs, see TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE MYTH 1 (2005), just as the securities action is alleged to discourage investors and
impair raising capital. Thus, before a more stringent standard for certifying securities class
actions should be enacted, legislators and reformers should deeply question and consider
what it is about securities class actions alone that necessitates such drastic reform.
288. Hufford, supra note 240, at 596; Luis A. Aguilar, Comm'r, Sec. Exch. Comm'n,
Speech at North American Securities Administrators Association's Winter Enforcement
Conference: Empowering the Markets Watchdog to Effect Real Results (Jan. 10, 2009)
(transcript on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter
Aguilar, Empowering the Markets] ("The SEC's mission is very clear. It is to protect inves-
tors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate capital formation.").
289. See, e.g., Marcy Gordon, SEC Enforcement Chief Linda Thomsen Resigns, ABC NEWS,
Feb. 9, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=6838353 (on file with the Uni-
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (stating that the SEC Commission was a
lightning rod of criticism for the SEC's failure to detect a fifty billion dollar Ponzi scheme
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Moreover, the SEC, as a government organization, is limited by
bureaucratic barriers that do not limit private enforcement. 290 Until
recently, bureaucratic constraints caused SEC investigations and
subpoenas to logjam. 291 An additional vice of public enforcement-
absent from private attorneys general-is that the SEC has been
hampered in its role as an enforcement agency due to inadequate
funding.292 The SEC is funded by annual appropriation, subjecting
it to political pressures virtually year round.9  A stagnant SEC
budget has had severe consequences. 94 As one SEC Commissioner
noted: "In the last few years, the Enforcement Division of the SEC
despite red flags raised by outsiders over the course of a decade); Theo Francis, SEC's Cox
Catches Blame for Financial Crisis, Bus. WK, Sept. 19, 2008 (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.businessweek.com/print/
bwdaily/dnflash/content/sep2008/db20080918_764469.htm (quoting the former head of
the Congressional Budget Office as stating that the SEC "failed in its most fundamental
oversight and surveillance functions."); Amit R. Paley & David S. Hilzenrath, SEC Chief De-
fends His Restraint, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2008, at Al (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/12/23/AR2008122302765_pf.html (stating that the SEC failed to detect the
fraud of the largest Ponzi scheme in history); Nicholas Rummell, Tumble in Restatements
Sparks Criticism of SEC, FIN. WK, Aug. 25, 2008 (on file with the University of Michigan Jour-
nal of Law Reform), available at http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=
/20080825/REG/860815/-1/FWIssueAlert01&template=printart (stating that a steep de-
cline in restatements and material weaknesses in 2008 was more to do with a sleepier
securities watchdog than with compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act); see also Posting of
Richard Posner to The Becker-Posner Blog, Bernard Madoff and Ponzi Schemes,
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2008/12/ (Dec. 21, 2008, 16:45 EST) (stat-
ing that the SEC seems to have been "asleep at the switch quite a bit of late.").
290. Gordon, supra note 289 (stating that there were serious questions about the impar-
tiality and fairness of the SEC's investigation of alleged insider trading scheme for a hedge
fund and claiming there was alleged political interference into the investigation by agency
officials); Paley & Hilzenrath, supra note 289, at Al (describing how SEC Chief Christopher
Cox agreed to a three-week ban on short selling because of intense pressure from the
Treasury Secretary and Federal Reserve Chairman).
291. Aguilar, Empowering the Markets, supra note 288. However, Mary Schapiro, newly
appointed as Chairman, has changed this bureaucratic structure by replacing antiquated
approval orders with "permission slips" to be approved by a single member of the Commis-
sion rather than all five. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Address to
Practising Law Institute's "SEC Speaks in 2009" Program (Feb. 6, 2009) (transcript on file
with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
292. Paley & Hilzenrath, supra note 289, at Al (quoting Colleen M. Kelly, the president
of the National Treasury Employees Union, as stating that there have not been enough
resources or staffing over the years for the SEC to oversee the number of companies for
which it is responsible).
293. Aguilar, Empowering the Markets, supra note 288.
294. Luis A. Aguilar, Comm'r, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the Practising Law Insti-
tute's "SEC Speaks in 2009" Program: Increasing Accountability and Transparency to
Investors (Feb. 6, 2009) (transcript on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform) [hereinafter Aguilar, Increasing Accountability] (stating that a stagnant SEC
budget results in a limited hiring ability, difficulty in retaining adequate staff, limited tech-
nological advancements, curbed development, and limited ability to initiate new programs
and investigations).
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has been coping with less staff and fewer resources. This is clearly
not what has been needed in a time of deregulation and clearly not
what Congress had in mind when it enacted Sarbanes-Oxley .. .
Indeed, by 2006, SEC staff turnover was at its highest level in five
years and the amount of attorneys in well-staffed enforcement
groups dwindled.296 From 2005 to 2008, the total number of attor-
neys able to investigate fraud cases decreased by ten percent.
297
Similarly, the SEC's budget allocation has been relatively flat from
2005 to 2008.298 Compare the SEC's budget with that of the FDIC:
With often less than $900 million in hand and approximately
3,500 staff, the SEC is tasked with regulating tens of thousands
of entities including public companies, investment advisers,
broker-dealers, transfer agents, exchanges, credit rating agen-
cies, and several SROs.... [T]he FDIC has a staff of 5,000 to
oversee 8,300 FDIC insured banks with a budget in the range
from $1.2 to $2.2 billion dollars. Moreover, the FDIC is inde-
pendently funded and thus, has control over its own budget
and long term projects.
299
As of 2009, SEC Commissioners acknowledged that the SEC has
been disempowered and the focus of the SEC has been on cases
with little market reach.3 9  Hence, private enforcement has
emerged to fill the gap. A recent study from NERA Economic Con-
sulting supports this conclusion, finding: "[M]ost SEC settlements
do not parallel shareholder class actions. In 2007, only 22% of SEC
settlements were with public companies or their employees and
related to misstatements, and were therefore closely comparable to
shareholder class actions."9'
Aside from bureaucratic barriers, there is now some support for
the tentative hypothesis that SEC officials may not engage in truly
impartial enforcement.30 2 For example, a recent study concludes
295. Aguilar, Empowering the Markets, supra note 288. The SEC has had to freeze hir-
ing as well to keep pace with year-to-year expense increases. Id.
296. Id. (noting that enforcement groups composed of fifteen lawyers often had only
seven or eight lawyers by 2006).
297. Id.
298. Id. (stating that the budget was $888 million in 2005, $888.1 in 2006, $881.6 in
2007, and $906 million in 2008).
299. Aguilar, Increasing Accountability, supra note 294.
300. Aguilar, Empowering the Markets, supra note 288 (calling for empowerment of en-
forcement staff and a concentration of resources on cases with greater market reach).
301. Larsen, supra note 227, at 7.
302. Stavros Gadinis, Is Investor Protection the Top Priority of SEC Enforcement? Evidence From
Actions Against Broker-Dealers 5 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Fellows' Discussion
Paper Series No. 27, 2009) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform),
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that the SEC pursued broker-dealer violations by initiating admin-
istrative proceedings, as opposed to civil lawsuits, because courts
were a worse forum for finance professionals."" In addition, in ad-
ministrative cases, the study concludes that for the same violation
and comparable levels of harm to investors, big firms and their
employees are less likely to receive a ban from the securities indus-
try when compared to small firms and their employees.0 4 The study
then discredits the possibility that these enforcement disparities
can be explained by the arguably better compliance systems larger
firms have in place by finding that small and big firm violations for
failing to supervise subordinates were virtually indistinguishable. 305
Last, the study connects the enforcement disparity with post-SEC
career trajectories of agency officials.0 6 As a result, the study con-
cludes that SEC officials may be responding to future employment
prospects by giving prospective employers favorable treatment.
30 7
The public/private partnership that has evolved leads to more
comprehensive enforcement of the securities laws. 0 8 Corporate
officials will have a strong desire to avoid accusations of fraud, even
if they come only in the form of a private securities lawsuit.3 9 Thus,
private securities class actions empower an otherwise impotent
class of harmed investors that may have been lost in the bureau-
cratic shuffle or self-serving aims of SEC officials.10
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/fellows.papers/pdf/
Gadinis_27.pdf; see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Zvika Neeman, Investor Protection and Interest
Group Politics 28-33 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Fellows' Discussion Paper
Series No. 603, 2008) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1030355 (discussing how
lobbying by interest groups can affect the level of investor protection.) We truly doubt that
such biased behavior is intentional. Nevertheless, the evidence indicating that it occurs is
disconcerting.
303. Gadinis, supra note 302, at 4.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 5.
306. Id.
307. Id. The problem of revolving doors in government practice comes as no surprise as
even rules of legal ethics address such concerns. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.9, 1.10, 1.11 (2008). However, affording different SEC sanctions based on employment
prospects does not serve any legitimate public policy.
308. LaCroix, supra note 263 (paraphrasing ProfessorJames Cox's debate at the Forum
for Institutional Investors). Others have concluded that extensive disclosure requirements
and standards of liability facilitating investor recovery are associated with larger stock mar-
kets. Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws? 23 (Tuck Sch. of Bus., Working
Paper No. 03-22, 2003) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=425880. Private monitoring is positively correlated
with capital markets and the banking system. Id. at 24.
309. LaCroix, supra note 263. Indeed, corporate officials have more of a desire to avoid
private accusations of fraud as those accusations may raise the specter of SEC enforcement.
310. Nancy Trejos, Irate Investors Filing More Class-Action Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20,
2009 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at
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2. Securities Class Actions Compensate Investor-Plaintiffs
Private securities class actions supplement SEC enforcement, but
also compensate injured investors.
[W] ith more investment opportunities available, including in-
creasingly complex financial products, and more investors
relying on managers and other intermediaries, the need for
honesty and integrity is greater than ever. Investor confidence
has been badly shaken, and we need to reestablish stability by
returning to the bedrock principle that the capital markets
should be known for their integrity and honesty.
31
Plaintiffs who are wronged in the market should have a remedy.
Despite the astounding losses securities class-action plaintiffs
claim to have suffered, 12 scholars critique securities class actions by
claiming they serve no valid compensatory function.3 Judge Frank
H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel have set out the seminal
criticism of securities fraud class actions by claiming that active
traders with diversified portfolios are as likely to be on the gaining
side of a transaction tainted by securities fraud as on the losing
side. 4 In other words, an investor is equally likely to gain five dol-
lars on account of fraud as to lose five dollars to fraud. Thus,
diversified investors have no expected net losses from fraud
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/an/20/business/fi-investsuits20 ("To cut down on legal
expenses and exert their power in numbers, investors are banding together in securities
class-action lawsuits.").
311. Aguilar, Empowering the Markets, supra note 288. Chairman Mary L. Schapiro
noted in a speech given in February:
Trillions of dollars of wealth have been lost. Our economy is in recession. And inves-
tor confidence has been badly shaken. Middle-class families who were relying on that
nest egg to send a son or daughter to college or for a secure retirement now don't
know where to turn.
Schapiro, supra note 291. It has long been recognized by the courts as well that "the class
action affords a large number of plaintiffs with relatively small claims a chance to obtain
redress through aggregation." In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Lifig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1350
(N.D. Cal. 1994).
312. According to a recent news report, 856 billion dollars. Trejos, supra note 310.
313. Alicia Davis Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. CoRr. L. 223, 225 (2007)
(discussing Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel's article concerning the inefficiency of
securities class action damages).
314. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U.
Cmi. L. REV. 611, 642 (1985). However, the fact that a large number of sophisticated, well-
informed and profit-motivated institutional investors continue to actively participate in these
cases indicates that these institutions believe that litigation is within their financial interest.
LaCroix, supra note 263.
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because their expected losses will match their expected gains.
However, as Professor Alicia Davis Evans ascertains, "securities
fraud can cause substantial injury to investors of all types. Compen-
sation, therefore, is justified to make these investors whole."
3 16
Professor Evans first establishes that there is a fundamental asymme-
try in a market's reaction to fraudulent announcements. 317 For
gains and losses to be equivalent over time, according to Evans, an
investor must find himself on the winning side of fraud-tainted
trades more, by dollar volume, than the investor finds himself on
the losing side because losses of investors on the losing side of
trades tainted by fraud are more likely to exceed the gains of the
3181investors on the winning side of these trades.
Second, according to Evans, even large, diversified investors are
not immune to this asymmetry and can suffer substantial losses.31 9
Evans explains that the findings from a 2005 U.S. Chamber of
Commerce Institute for Legal Reform indicate that it is possible for
gains and losses to be significantly different for even large, diversi-
fied investors.32 ' Third, Evans clarifies that even losses of buy-and-
hold investors are likely to exceed any gains from fraud because
one must sell stocks with prices that are inflated by fraud as often
as one buys stocks with prices that are inflated by fraud.3 2' Last,
315. Evans, supra note 313, at 225 (citing Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 314, at 641).
316. Id. at 229.
317. Id.
318. Id. Additionally, the "portfolio theory is not raised as an objection to other types of
commercial litigation, where one company sues another to recover damages. The same
pocket shifting argument could be applied to all commercial litigation, but no one is sug-
gesting that all commercial litigation be eliminated as unjustified under portfolio theory."
LaCroix, supra note 263 (paraphrasing Professor Cox).
319. Evans, supra note 313, at 230.
320. Id. at 231. Professor Cox notes, however, that even if a diversified institutional in-
vestor could come out ahead, at a minimum, this does not apply to the initial public offering
and merger-and-acquisition contexts. LaCroix, supra note 263 (discussing Professor Cox's
statements at the Forum for Institutional Investors).
321. Evans, supra note 313, at 232. Professor Evans sets forth the following hypothetical
to illustrate:
Imagine the extreme case of the buy-and-hold investor that buys, but never sells (i.e.,
she holds the stocks in her portfolio until infinity). If this investor purchases a stock
with a price that is inflated by fraud, the amount of this overpayment will never be re-
couped by a gain from selling a stock that also has an inflated price. This investor
never sells. It is, of course, somewhat unrealistic to speak of an investor that never
sells stock. Liquidity needs prompt virtually every investor to sell some stock eventu-
ally. However, the net buyer (rare seller) is not likely to have equivalent gains and
losses from fraud. Thus, it is clear that this type of investor, who is following a rational
investment strategy, is not going to be economically indifferent to the incidence of
fraud.
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Evans notes that the portfolio theory only applies to diversified in-
vestors and that undiversified investors can suffer substantial harm
from securities fraud,22 Thus, Evans concludes that because inves-
323tors suffer an ascertainable wrong, there ought to be a remedy.
322. Id. at 235-36. This point should not be readily dismissed. In an age where stock
trading is within the keystrokes of almost every individual, more and more unsophisticated
investors will be able to dabble in market investment who lack the wherewithal to develop a
diversified portfolio. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Suitability Claims and Purchases of Un-
recommended Securities: An Agency Theory of Broker-Dealer Liability, 37 ARiz. ST. L.J. 535, 537-41
(2005); Nancy S. Libin & James S. Wrona, The Securities Industry and the Internet: A Suitable
Match?, I COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 601, 602-04, 677 (2001); Denis T. Rice, Jurisdiction in Cyber-
space: Which Law and Forum Apply to Securities Transactions on the Internet?, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 585, 600-07 (2000).
323. Evans, supra note 313, at 235-36. Ultimately, however, Evans goes on to argue that
the securities class action (1) fails to provide meaningful compensation; (2) is largely inef-
fective; and (3) is too costly and complex to burden courts. Id. at 238-40.
Evans first claims that because insurers often are not willing to offer premiums that reach
the level of harm complained of, adequate compensation is never obtained. Id. at 238. Ev-
ans, however, fails to address the fact that corporations can obtain insurance in layers, for
example, insuring the first $100 million of loss, the next $100 million, and so on. See Tom
Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors' and Officers' Insurance and Securities
Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 809 (2009) (describing the insurance "tower"). Moreover,
just because compensation may be inadequate in some ways is no reason to throw the baby
out with the bath water. Additionally, insurance premiums, while they may be higher for
financial services firms due to recent events, "for industries outside of financial services, it's a
completely different story." Russ Banham, A Tale of Two Markets: Are Your D&O Premiums
About to Soar? That Depends on Which Industry You're In, CFO MAG., Apr. 1, 2009 (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.cfo.com/
article.cfm/13356884?f=search. In fact, D&O insurance rates remain relatively flat in mar-
kets other than financial services. Id.
Second, Evans' proposed "investor compensation fund" may in fact encourage, rather
than discourage riskier or more fraudulent behavior. The investor compensation fund
represents a form of social insurance for securities fraud. "[P]eople who are insured may
choose to engage in more risky behavior as a result." THOMAS SOWELL, APPLIED ECONOMICS:
THINKING BEYOND STAGE ONE 154 (2008). While as a society we want to encourage risk-
taking and innovation in business, it would be imprudent to encourage risk-taking that bor-
ders securities fraud. "Innovative" accounting is largely what led to the downfall of Enron.
See MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 233.
Third, Evans also argues that private class actions are ineffective because they focus on
larger cases and neglect smaller firms. Evans, supra note 313, at 239. Studies support this
assertion, as a recent survey of SEC enforcement indicates that private actions do not overlap
with SEC actions. Larsen, supra note 227, at 7 ("SEC settlements do not parallel shareholder
class actions." (emphasis added)). This is, in fact, a good thing: the SEC focuses on cases
that private litigation may ignore and vice versa. This way, nobody is falling through the
gaps.
Fourth, Evans argues that securities class actions are ineffective because the culpable par-
ties are not required to pay anything in settlement. Evans, supra note 313, at 239; see also
Chester S. Spatt, Chief Economist, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the American
Economic Association: Penalties and Sanctions for Securities Fraud (Jan. 6, 2007) (tran-
script on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (stating that if
settlement terms are restricted to prohibit executives from being indemnified, it would re-
duce their ability to settle claims). However, the relevant inquiry is whether the threat of
private litigation raises the standard of conduct across the marketplace among all compa-
nies. LaCroix, supra note 263 (paraphrasing Professor Cox). This is difficult to measure, but
WINTER 2010]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
3. Raising Class Certification Barriers May Increase Litigation Costs
Finally, increasing securities class action barriers may contribute
to rising securities litigation costs and rising settlement values.
Consider the following:
(1) Congress enacted the PSLRA and its strong inference re-
quirement in response to perceived abuses of discovery in
securities litigation; (2) plaintiffs compensate for the higher
risk of litigation, i.e., increased risk of dismissal as a result of
the higher pleading standard, by bringing cases with larger
damages; (3) thus, the cost of litigation, including discovery,
as it is proportional to the size of the claim, rises; (4) then,
these higher litigation costs are misperceived as abuses.324
This is precisely the problem with raising the class certification bar-
rier as well. (1) The federal courts have heightened the class
325certification standard in response to perceived abuses by litigants.
(2) Plaintiffs will compensate for the higher risk of denial of class
certification by bringing cases with larger damages.2 6 (3) Discovery
and pre-trial litigation costs, correlative with the amount of dam-
ages at issue, will rise when the amount of damages rises.327 (4)
the fact that U.S. markets generally are down less than other markets in the recent eco-
nomic downturn indicates that these safeguards are doing theirjob. Id.
Finally, Evans contends that securities litigation is costly and consumes judicial resources.
Evans, supra note 313, at 240. Nevertheless, cost is something largely controlled by the par-
ties involved. SeeYablon, supra note 145, at 1624 n.16 (stating that clients have staff whose
job it is to keep the costs of discovery down). Cases involving larger losses will involve larger
costs. See supra notes 271-276 and accompanying text. Evans herself acknowledges that an
investor can suffer substantial losses. Evans, supra note 313, at 228. Thus, substantial litiga-
tion costs are to be expected. Moreover, solely because securities actions take up judicial
resources, it is no solution to fraud to remove the case from the court's purview.
324. Wunderlich, supra note 116, at 663 (citations omitted); see also Rice, supra note
148, at 285 (" [T] he comprehensive system of procedural hurdles and substantive limitations
helps to explain why some smaller plaintiff firms with limited resources have apparently left
the private class action securities arena. Such procedural requirements and the increased
cost of maintaining class actions mean that plaintiff firms need greater resources in order to
conduct pre-filing investigation and sophisticated motion practice.").
325. Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 267 (5th Cir.
2007).
326. See Choi, supra note 134, at 606-09 (describing statistics whereby plaintiffs com-
pensate for the higher risk of dismissal because of a heightened pleading standard by
bringing suits with higher damages); Perino, supra note 137, at 941 (large settlements and
fee awards since enactment of the PSLRA indicate continued incentive for attorneys to file
securities class actions).
327. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 250, at 797 (finding that as a plaintiff's expected
recovery rose, so did the medians of both defendant and plaintiff costs attributable to dis-
covery).
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These higher litigation costs will then be misperceived as abuses.
To appreciate the implications of this concept, consider the con-
cept as illustrated below:
FIGURE 1
Federal courts, like Oscar
and In re Salomon,
erect class certification






Plaintiffs compensate tar the
higher risk of class
certification denial by bringing
claims with higher damages.
Discovery, and other
pre-trial costs, rise to
meet the rising level of
claimed damages.
In a roundabout fashion, federal courts may actually raise the
very securities litigation costs they sought to avoid by heightening
the class certification standard.
VI. CONCLUSION
[I] n our society that is growing in complexity there are bound
to be innumerable people in common disasters, calamities, or
ventures who would go begging for justice without the class
action but who could with all regard to due process be pro-
tected by it. Some of these are consumers whose claims may
seem de minimis but who alone have no practical recourse for
either remuneration or injunctive relief....
The class action is one of the few legal remedies the small
claimant has against those who command the status quo.
[The system should] strengthen his hand with the view of
328. See supra Part IV.A.2.
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creating a system of law that dispenses justice to the lowly as
well as to those liberally endowed with power and wealth.
Courts have not heeded this plea. This trend of conducting merits
inquiries at the class certification stage neglects the small claimant.
The trend flouts Congressional intent. Congress has already en-
acted significant devices to control the perceived in terrorem threat
that securities actions pose, and heightened class certification is
not among them. Moreover, class certification merits inquiries con-
travene Supreme Court precedent. Specifically in the realm of
securities litigation, the Supreme Court has held that the element
of reliance is rebuttable at trial. Most problematic, Rule 23 merits
inquiries abridge a class action plaintiffs constitutional right to a
jury trial.
Not only is this Rule 23 trial trend devoid of any legal justifica-
tion, it is bad policy and makes for bad law. "People who are trying
to make a buck at the expense of investors need to know they are
not welcome in the capital markets."30 Yet the Rule 23 trial trend
currently underway by the federal courts fails to send this message.
329. Eisen v. Carlise &Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156, 185-86 (1974) (Douglas,J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part) (emphasis omitted).
330. Aguilar, Empowering the Markets, supra note 288.
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